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ABSTRACT 
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have emerged as important informal institutions 
in Latin America.  This thesis looks at: 1) the emergence of DTOs within Colombia and 
Brazil, 2) how DTOs meet the criteria for being informal institutions, and 3) what 
sustains DTOs.  In both cases, drug trafficking was shaped by expansions and shifts of 
drug production within the Andean region from the 1960s onward.  DTOs in Colombia 
emerged in the mid-1960s and 1970s while DTOs in Brazil took root with the 
introduciton of the drug trade in the region in the late 1970s to early 1980s.  DTOs in 
Colombia and Brazil qualify as informal institutions based on structural composition, 
stability, behavioral control, and social cohesion.  Sustainability in the Colombian case 
study is attributed to the DTOs’ capacity to learn and adapt to U.S. and Colombian efforts 
while capitalizing on policy failures.  Sustainability in the Brazilian case study is 
attributed to the DTOs’ capacity to become entrenched in favela (poor urban) zones.  
Analysis of the case studies reveals divergent paths and characteristics of DTOs.  In 
particular, internal warfare coupled with an emphasis on illicit drug production in 
Colombia has led DTOs to focus on the control of rural land.  In Brazil, meanwhile, the 
absence of internal conflict and the emphasis on illicit distribution (retail) in Brazil has 
resulted in the DTOs focusing on controlling points of sale and internal, informal 
governance within the favela zones. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Illegal, informal institutions that are firmly entrenched in society jeopardize state 
and human security.  Historically and currently Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) 
have often emerged as important informal institutions in Latin America.  In many cases, 
these drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operate in the context of shadow 
sovereignty, whereupon the organizations possess both the resources and the threat of 
violence to control certain areas with relative impunity.  This thesis looks at DTOs in 
Colombia and Brazil as important case studies for understanding the drug trade in 
differing contexts.  Analysis of DTOs in Colombia and Brazil offer important 
comparisons from which two important drug trade factors can drawn. Internal conflict 
and drug production (or lack thereof) shapes the very nature of drug trafficking in these 
countries.  Colombia experiences civil war; hence, Colombian DTOs place emphasis on 
drug production and international distribution.  Brazil on the other hand lacks civil war; 
hence, Brazilian DTOs are focused on drug sales within the country.  To flesh out the 
analysis this thesis looks at: 1) the emergence of DTOs in Colombia and Brazil, 2) how 
these DTOs meet the criteria for being informal institutions, and, 3) what sustains these 
organizations.   
First, in both cases, drug trafficking was shaped by expansions and shifts in drug 
production within the Andean region.  Geographic proximity facilitated this pattern as 
drug trafficking progressed into Colombia and Brazil.  Specifically, DTOs in Colombia 
manifested in the mid-1960s and 1970s, while DTOs in Brazil manifested with the 
introduction of the drug trade in the late 1970s to early 1980s.  Second, DTOs in 
Colombia and Brazil qualify as informal institutions based on four institutional 
parameters; these parameters consist of structural composition, stability, behavioral 
control and social cohesion.  Finally, sustainability for DTOs in the case studies is 
addressed.  Sustainability in the Colombian case study is attributed to two factors, the 
first being competitive adaptation.  Competitive adaptation refers to how traffickers learn 
within “complex adaptive systems; within these systems, DTOs gather and analyze 
 2
information to change practices and outmaneuver their opponents.”1  The second factor 
of sustainability in Colombia is attributed to strategic failures on the part of U.S. and 
Colombian policies.  Sustainability in the Brazilian case study is attributed to social 
networks.  Specifically, DTOs in Brazil’s favelas,2 entrench and empower themselves 
within these large slums in Brazil’s major cities.  Colombia and Brazil exhibit similarities 
and differences in how DTOs operate in their respective contexts.   
With regard to how DTOs first emerged, the cases studies paint a picture of pre-
existing conditions and illicit networks that linked up to a burgeoning drug trade.  In this 
regard, the case studies are similar.  Nonetheless, we also observe important variations.  
As illicit cultivation shifted in the Andean region, drug production and trafficking found a 
home in Colombia.  The drug dynamics in Colombia were increasingly shaped by 
insurgency and paramilitary factors, and the trade manifested in areas outside state 
control, such as rural lands owned by insurgent and paramilitary forces.  Brazil on the 
other hand became a corridor for trafficking, and the illicit trade increasingly catered to 
an insular domestic market.  Brazil’s domestic insular market comprises of favelas, these 
“brown areas”3 are more or less run outside the auspices of the state.   
In addition to analyzing the emergence of these DTOs, the thesis highlights 
similarities and differences of DTOs as institutions in order to understand how they 
operate in their specific contexts.  DTOs in both cases operate as informal institutions and 
exhibit similarities with respect to structural composition, stability, behavioral control 
and social cohesion.  Institutional similarities are attributed to the general nature of 
criminal enterprise in of itself; this observation holistically characterizes organizations 
involved in illicit activities.   Institutional differences in these DTOs are shaped by the 
specific and differing contexts in which DTOs operate.  After highlighting these 
                                                 
1 Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government 
Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 
2007), 6.    
2 Favelas are characterized as slum cities built along the hillsides of Rio and other Brazilian cities 
(Huguet and Carvalho 2008, 95).  
3 Brown areas are geographical territories that display characteristics of low or non-existent state 
presence (in terms of a reasonable set of effective bureaucracies and of the effectiveness of properly 
sanctioned legality) (O'Donnell 1993, 1359). 
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institutional similarities and differences, the thesis also addresses similarities and 
differences in what sustains the DTOs in the case studies.  
In looking at sustainability factors, DTOs in both cases have proven to be organic, 
evolving entities.  In Colombia, sustainability is attributed to competitive adaptation and 
strategic failures in U.S. and Colombian policies.  In Brazil, sustainability is attributed to 
informal networks.  The essential take-away is what sustains these DTOs in their 
respective contexts.  Colombian DTOs competitively adapt to counter-drug efforts to 
ensure continued cultivation, production, transportation, and distribution of illicit drugs 
with a focus on the international market.  Moreover, strategic failures in U.S. and 
Colombian policy have attributed to the continued proliferation of DTOs and the drug 
trade.  These strategic failures are highlighted by piecemeal approaches toward actors 
within the drug trade as well as elements of failure within Plan Colombia.4  Brazilian 
DTOs utilize social networks control the drug trade within favela zones, and they (DTOs) 
possess a focus that is much more insular in catering to a domestic market.  The nature of 
drug trafficking in Colombia and Brazil emerges and operates differently due to varying 
political, societal, and state-capacity contexts.  The next section addresses the importance 
of looking at drug trafficking from an overall perspective, and why DTOs deserve special 
attention. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF DRUG TRAFFICKING ANALYSIS 
As a whole, the study of drug trafficking requires analysis in order to understand 
and stave off continued proliferation of illicit drugs.  The transnational trend of drug 
trafficking affects the western hemisphere and erodes the basis of state capacity across 
much of Latin America.5  First, we should take note of cyclical economic crises and 
pervasive socioeconomic inequality among many citizens.6  Moreover, informal 
economies and drug trafficking organizations influence citizens’ socioeconomic choices 
                                                 
4 Plan Colombia is a $1.3 billion funding plan from the United States to Colombia in counter-
insurgency and counter-narcotics efforts (2000–2008).  
5 Michael Shifter, “Latin America's Drug Problem,” Current History (February 2007): 58. 
6 Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras, “Social Structure and Change in Latin America,” In Latin 
America: Its Problems and Its Promise, by Jan Knippers Black (New York, NY: Westview Press, 2005). 
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in Latin America.7  Given the pervasive social and economic inequality present in both 
Colombia and Brazil, it seems that drug trafficking organizations provide opportunities 
that governments cannot.  These economic factors coupled with comparatively scarce 
counter-drug resources, means the governments of Latin America are ill equipped to 
compete with DTOs in many respects.  This trend adversely impacts the prospects for 
democracy in the region because the drug trade threatens citizen security, state capacity, 
and the basis for rule of law.  In addition, as drug trafficking continuously infiltrates 
North America, the negative spill-over effects will continue to threaten security for the 
United States and the western hemisphere as a whole.  DTOs facilitate this trend of drug 
trafficking that erodes the western hemisphere. 
As chief purveyors of illicit drugs, DTOs require explicit attention; historical 
proliferation of the drug trade questions the nature of DTO perseverance. How have 
DTOs staved off state prosecution and drug eradication efforts for so long?  Because 
these organizations jeopardize state and human security, it is imperative to identify 
factors enabling the institutionalization of drug trafficking organizations.  While most 
drug policy debate explores a myriad of counter-drug initiatives and approaches, less 
focus has been paid to how drug trafficking organizations become institutionalized.  It is 
important to note that these organizations have the capacity to infiltrate the state on many 
levels and operate with relative impunity.8  While these organizations may not have 
political goals of insurgency groups or terrorists, their resources, connections, and ability 
to exercise unchecked violence threatens to supplant the state as the legitimate sovereign 
on the sub-national level.      
Understanding the institutionalization of DTOs is a preliminary step in 
understanding these organizations.  Understanding divergent paths by which DTOs take 
root and are maintained offers more insight into preventing these organizations from 
                                                 
7 Friedrich Schneider and Enste H. Dominik, “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences,” 
Journal of Economic Literature 38, no.1 (March 2000): 77–78 and Alejandro Portes et al., The Informal 
Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1989), 1–7. 
8 Adriana Beltran, The Captive State: Organized Crime and Human Rights in Latin America, WOLA 
Special Report, Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America (October 2007), 2. 
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growing stronger or even emerging in the first place.  Contemporary analysis points to 
national level counter-drug studies that fail to take into account the specific contexts in 
which DTOs operate as institutions.   Examples of national level analysis include reports 
by the Latin America commission on Drugs and Democracy (2009) and the Council on 
Foreign Relations Independent Task Force (2008).  These reports are useful for looking at 
regions but do not provide country-specific analysis of DTOs.  The reports cite 
parameters such as global demand and pervasive inequality as crucial factors for global 
drug trends.9  DTOs in these reports are observed problems with no added analysis.  
Country specific policy frameworks such as Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative 
(Mexico) identify micro-level factors in the drug trade, such as insurgency or weakened 
judicial institutions.10  However, these frameworks fail to address the specific contexts in 
which DTOs operate as institutions.  By identifying roots, institutional parameters, and 
sustainability of DTOs in the case studies of Colombia and Brazil, policy can be 
developed to curtail the proliferation of DTOs in their respective contexts.  While DTOs 
have been established as facilitators of drug trafficking, the next section discusses 
institutionalism as applied to DTOs to gain further understanding.   
B. DTOS AS INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS   
This section explains how the institutional parameters of structural composition, 
stability, behavioral control and social cohesion were chosen for analyzing DTOs in the 
case studies.  Understanding how DTOs qualify as informal institutions enhances the 
understanding of these organizations on three levels: first how they emerged, second, 
how DTOs are characterized, and finally, how DTOs sustain themselves as viable 
                                                 
9 James T. Hill, Charlene Barshefsky, and Shannon K. O'Neil, U.S.-Latin American Relations: A New 
Direction for a New Reality. Independent Task Force Report No. 60, New York, NY: Council on Foreign 
Relations (2008); and Latin American Commission on Drugs & Democracy, “Drugs and Democracy: 
Toward a Paradigm Shift,” Latin American Commission on Drugs & Democracy, Rio de Janerio: Latin 
American Commission on Drugs & Democracy (2009), 5–11. 
10 GAO, Plan Colombia: Drug reduction goals were not fully met, but security has improved; U.S. 
agencies need more detailed plans for reducing assistance, GAO Report 09-71, Washington, D.C.: 
Government Accountability Office (October 2008); and Clare R Seelke, Merida Initiative for Mexico and 
Central America: Funding and Policy Issues. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (January 
13, 2009). 
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institutional entities.  The next paragraph outlines what institutionalization encompasses 
and how Colombian and Brazilian DTOs are characterized as informal institutions. 
There are many definitions of institutions, and such definitions can be applied 
across the board in the organizational, political and social sense.  Within this thesis, 
institutions are understood as a collection of norms, rules, understandings, and routines.  
Moreover, these characteristics may be embedded in specific structures or 
organizations.11  Informal institutions embody the same characteristics as formal 
institutions with important caveats.  Informal institutions encompass “socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels.”12  By contrast, formal institutions are enforced via widely 
accepted official channels; moreover, many of the rules and norms are documented or 
published.  These definitions encapsulate both formal and informal instititutions. 
Furthermore, it is important to discern institutionalization as a process.  Institutions are 
social structures or organizations, whereas institutionalization is the process by which 
these entities (social structures or organizations) develop social habits or highly 
recognized patterns of behavior that change little over time.13  Colombian and Brazilian 
DTOs display informal institutional characteristics.  DTOs also qualify as informal 
institutions because they operate outside officially sanctioned channels.   
Understanding DTOs as informal institutions entails further codification and 
established literature allows for varied interpretations of both formal and informal 
institutions.  Thus, the thesis characterizes DTOs through a combination of parameters.  
Structural composition, stability, behavioral control, and social cohesion represent the 
best synthesis (among utilized literature) for defining informal institutions.  Moreover, 
these parameters provide a common basis for looking at DTOs in the case studies.  The 
                                                 
11 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press, 1989), 21–
26; and “Chapter 34: The Logic of Appropriateness,” In The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, by 
Michael Moran, Martin Rein and Robert E. Goodwin (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
691.  
12 Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A 
Research Agenda,” Perspective on Politics 2:4 (December 2004): 727. 
13 Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper, The Social Science Encyclopedia. 2nd Ed (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1996), 417.  
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following paragraphs illustrate how the above parameters will be utilized to define 
Colombian and Brazilian DTOs as informal institutions.  Moreover, justification is 
provided through synthesis of resources.  
Structural composition is utilized as an institutional parameter to differentiate 
DTOs from the phenomenon of drug trafficking more broadly.  Specifically, “structural 
composition” refers to how DTOs emerge as prominent actors within and as a part of 
society.  Criminal enterprise incorporates marginalized actors that engage in nefarious or 
unaccepted practices; while this is true, the Colombia and Brazil case studies illustrate 
DTOs as prominent features of society in their respective contexts.  Structural 
composition is derived from Kuper & Kuper, whereupon social institutions are 
considered a structural feature of society.14  Moreover, the parameter draws from 
Huntington, where an organization may be defined by its autonomy-subordination 
dynamic.15  According to Huntington, an institution is differentiated and insulated from 
other entities and is therefore subject to degrees of autonomy-subordination.  Thus, the 
synthesis of Kuper and Huntington provides our first institutional parameter. 
 Stability refers to how long an institution has been in existence, regardless of 
varying contexts.  The longer an organization has been in existence, means the higher the 
level of institutionalization that will occur; moreover, the degree of stability indicates the 
enhanced potential for the continued existence of an organization in the future.   
The probability that an organization which is one hundred years old will 
survive one additional year…is perhaps one hundred times greater that the 
probability that an organization one year old will survive one additional 
year.16 
DTOs have existed since the 1970s in Colombia and the 1980s in Brazil.  Despite 
counter-drug efforts in these countries, the drug trade and associated organizations have 
proliferated in contemporary times.  In Colombia, drug trafficking remains a prominent 
                                                 
14 Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper, The Social Science Encyclopedia. 2nd Ed (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1996), 417. 
15 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay.” World Politics 17, no. 3 
(1965): 401. 
16 Ibid., 395. 
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problem in the region as witnessed by the continuation of near pre-Plan Colombia levels 
of production and distribution of cocaine.17  Moreover, the drug trade in Brazil still exists 
today as witnessed by drug violence raging in contemporary Rio.18  These obersvations 
point to the continued prevalence of illicit drugs and shows the stability of Colombian 
and Brazilian DTOs.  Stability as an institutional parameter synthesizes Huntington’s 
characteristics of adaptability-rigidity and complexity-simplicity when looking at 
organizations.19  Adaptability-rigidity refers to chronological age, generational age, and 
functional terms of an institution.  Complexity-simplicity refers to diversification of 
functions (lest the institution outlives its means) within an institution.  Both 
characteristics provide measurement for long-term viability of an institution.  Thus, 
Huntington’s assessment is synthesized as stability within the thesis.   
Behavioral control refers to how institutions place expectations and rules on their 
members through officially or unofficially sanctioned channels.20  DTOs within the cases 
studies impose limits on their members and affect individual behavior through retribution 
and accountability.  In this respect, behavioral control characterizes DTOs as institutions 
and illustrates a facet of how DTOs operate.  Behavioral control as an institutional 
parameter synthesizes literature from Huntington, Helmke & Levitsky, as well as March 
& Olsen.  The underlying theme of the authors’ assessments point to implied 
understanding of appropriate action and mechanisms for control, placed on and within the 
institution.  The synthesis of literature surrounding expectations and mechanisms 
provides another parameter for analyzing DTOs. 
                                                 
17 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Trends in World Drug Markets: 1.3 Coca / Cocaine 
Market, World Drug Report, New York, NY: United Nations Publications (2007). 
18 CSIS, “Drug Wars in Rio de Janeiro.” Center for Strategic and International Studies: Transnational 
Threats Project (October 2009): 4.  
19 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay.” World Politics 17, no. 3 
(1965): 394–400. 
20 Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin 
America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 21; and James G. March and Johan P. 
Olsen, “Chapter 34: The Logic of Appropriateness.” In The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, by Michael 
Moran, Martin Rein and Robert E. Goodwin, 690–708 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
690–700.    
 9
Social cohesion encompasses shared ideals, beliefs, and values among members 
of an institution. Social cohesion is utilized as a parameter to identify members within an 
organization.  Social cohesion begets social collectivity, as members define themselves as 
part of a DTO, “they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of 
situation, based on identity-driven conceptions.”21  Drug trafficking organizations display 
social cohesion that culminates into a common social identity.  This social identity is also 
based on the utilization of symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that 
guide action for members within the institution.22  Social cohesion as an institutional 
parameter synthesizes literature from Huntington, March & Olsen, as well as Hall & 
Taylor.  Specifically, Huntington refers to coherence-disunity or an organization’s level 
of consensus.23  March & Olsen refer to members’ collectiveness in practicing rules of 
appropriateness within an institution.  Lastly, Hall & Taylor highlight sociological 
institutionalism, whereupon the institution incorporates symbols, scripts, and moral 
templates for action.  The authors provide the basis for synthesis within the thesis 
whereupon social cohesion is utilized to characterize informal institutions such as DTOs. 
Based on the characteristics of structural composition, stability, behavioral 
control, and social cohesion drug trafficking organizations are informal institutions.  The 
nature of drug trafficking in Colombia and Brazil emerges differently due to varying 
political, societal, and state-capacity contexts.  Subsequent chapters offer more detail.  
The next section highlights established literature and explanations surrounding the 
institutionalization of DTOs in general.  Furthermore, the next section explains why 
existing literature falls short in explaining the institutionalization of DTOs. 
                                                 
21 James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “Chapter 34: The Logic of Appropriateness.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Policy, by Michael Moran, Martin Rein and Robert E. Goodwin, 690–708 (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 689, 693.   
22 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. 
MPIFG Discussion Paper, Cambridge, MA: MPIFG Scientific Advisory Board (June 1996), 14. 
23 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay.” World Politics 17, no. 3 
(1965): 403–405.  
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are four explanations we can draw upon from literature to explain how 
DTOs have become institutionalized; these comprise of: 1) market considerations, 2) 
state-capacity conditions, 3) cultural perceptions of socioeconomic choices, and 4) 
network linkages.  While these explanations provide important insight for our case 
studies, no explanation establishes singular causation in the Colombian and Brazil case 
studies.   
First, drug trafficking may be founded upon illicit commodities finding their way 
to the market; the phenomenon is explained via a supply and demand business model 
with DTOs as essential facilitators.  The market for illicit drugs stimulates the structural 
emergence of DTOs.  For example, in mathematical terms, we can assume that the illicit 
drug supply curve is elastic (horizontal) in the long term.  Furthermore, the market 
demand for illicit drugs is always somewhat elastic in the long term.  Because of these 
supply and demand factors, drug trafficking will theoretically always remain a viable 
market.  All markets trigger mechanisms and require consumers, manufacturers, and 
distributors.  As DTOs advance and evolve, they display institutional characteristics to 
facilitate these market roles.24  Many approaches view DTOs as the operational means to 
the illicit commodities end.  However, less literature and research focuses on 
understanding the institutional nature of DTOs themselves.  This thesis accepts the 
prevailing conditions and structure of the supply and demand model.  Market forces 
provide the impetus for DTOs to organize and become efficient, and thus institutionalize.  
However, market forces alone cannot explain the development and institutional nature of 
DTOs in Colombia and Brazil.  This thesis aims to explain the development and 
institutional nature of DTOs outside the auspices of economic motivation and markets in 
order to provide better understanding within the specific contexts of Colombia and 
Brazil.     
                                                 
24 Marvin H. McGuire and Steven M. Carroll, “The Economics of the Drug War: Effective Federal 
Policy or Missed Opportunity?” (Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002), 
31–32. 
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Second, scholars argue that weakened states pave the way for the proliferation of 
drug trafficking.  This observation stresses a second-hand effect, insofar as the lack of 
state capacity is not directly equated with the institutionalization of DTOs.  Instead, the 
emphasis is placed on prevailing conditions exacerbated by weak state capacity.  
Primarily, social institutions may be seen as components by which social needs are met.25  
Therefore, if the state cannot provide the institutions necessary to meet societal needs, 
then opportunities exist for informal actors to meet those needs.  For example, in 
Brazilian favelas, the resources of security and life provisions are most notably controlled 
and parceled out by the drug traffickers.26  While legitimate actors may or may not 
possess the same resources as DTOs, the actuality or perception of weakened state 
capacity provides the prevailing condition and opportunities for the proliferation of 
DTOs.  DTOs assess vulnerability, opportunities, constraints, and adjusts according to 
state capacity.  One example is derived from Colombia in the 1990s.  
Colombia in the 1990s was a paradigm of a failing state dealing with a myriad of 
problems that included: “terrorism, kidnapping, murder, drug trafficking, corruption, an 
economic downturn of major scope, general lawlessness, and brain drain.  To top it off, 
the government was losing territory to an assortment of criminals that made war against 
the state and society.”27  The absence of institutions that underpin the rule of law 
threatens the state and its citizens.  As time passes, these organizations display 
institutional characteristics because power consolidation and avoiding state prosecution 
requires a reasonable amount of efficiency and efficacy.  To reiterate, territory, resources 
and networks may be regarded as zero-sum parameters; either the state or DTOs control 
these resources.  If state-capacity is lacking, then DTOs may control some of these 
resources.  In essence, weakened state capacity provides the prevailing conditions 
required for DTOs to institutionalize.  Therefore, weakened state capacity may be 
classified as a permissive cause to many of Latin America’s problems.  However, 
                                                 
25 Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper, The Social Science Encyclopedia. 2nd Ed. (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1996), 417. 
26 Donna Goldstein, review of Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro, by Enrique Desmond Arias, 
Comtemporary Sociology (2008): 578.  
27 Grabriel Marcella, Democratic Governance and the Rule of Law: Lessons from Colombia. Strategic 
Studies Institute Report, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute (December 2009), 1–2. 
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weakened state capacity does not adequately explain the nature or variance in which 
DTOs institutionalize in the case studies of Colombia and Brazil.  Studies have 
highlighted drug trafficking and DTO cells of operation in stronger states such as the 
United States, so weakened state capacity cannot account solely for the 
institutionalization of DTOs.  Examples can be derived from the numerous cross-
connections between drug cartels in Mexico and sleeper cells that operate in the United 
States as well as overwhelming security concerns along the U.S.–Mexican border.28 
Third, DTOs may emerge, mobilize, and strengthen themselves through the 
glorification of the “narco-culture.”  The primacy of institutional analysis in this regard 
focuses on the sense of shared values and utilizes an anthropology and sociology view.  
The narco-culture is most aptly summarized as “the lavish way in which drug-dealers 
show off their wealth in communities in which they live.”29  Examples may encompass 
sociological institutionalism due to an extensive use of symbol systems.30  Symbol 
systems manifest in a variety of ways to include tattoos, praying to “cartel death gods,” 
and narco-ballads.  Narco-ballads or narcocorridos appeal to “young, socially marginal 
and economically dislocated members of society” and point to common appealing themes 
of wealth, violence, law enforcement failures and other propaganda.31  The societal base 
for narcos (people involved in drug trafficking) and the proliferation of the narco-culture 
may be predicated on a common social identity; growing up on the streets of Rio or 
witnessing Colombia’s long history of political violence may provide specific contexts.   
                                                 
28 Fred Burton and Ben West, Stratfor: Global Intelligence. April 15, 2009, 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090415_When_Mexican_drug_trade_hits_border (accessed May 13, 
2009); and Fernando Romero and Lar, Hyper-Border: The Contemporary U.S.—Mexico Border and Its 
Future (New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008).  
29 Martin Meraz Garcia, “Narcoballads: The Psychology and Recruitment Process of the Narco,” 
Global Crime (2006): 200–213. 
30 See Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms. MPIFG Discussion Paper, Cambridge, MA: MPIFG Scientific Advisory Board (June 
1996) for aspects of sociological institutionalism. 
31 Martin Meraz Garcia, “Narcoballads: The Psychology and Recruitment Process of the Narco,” 
Global Crime, (2006): 206; and Mark Cameron Edgerg, El Narcotraficante: Narcocorridos and the 
Construction of a Cultural Persona on the U.S.–Mexico Border (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
2004), x–xi. 
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Moreover, given the pervasive socioeconomic inequality found in many parts of 
Latin America,32 literature suggests that the drug trafficking lifestyle provides 
inducements for recruitment via opportunities for wealth and status.  Trafficking wealth 
potential may be perceived as better than opportunities in the formal and legitimate 
sectors of society.33  This mindset is fueled by the perception that no other options exist.  
This analysis provides considerable insight into the recruitment of members and the 
overall sustainability of DTOs.  This sociological and anthropological approach does not 
establish a causal link between the narco-culture and the informal institutionalization of 
DTOs.  The narco-culture approach can be aptly categorized within institutional 
characteristics of mobilization and shared sense of values.  Moreover, literature has 
covered either a broad spectrum of the narco-culture, such as Martin Garcia illustrates in 
“Narcoballads,” or specific case studies like Mark Cameron Edgberg’s El 
Narcotraficante (with an emphasis on Mexico as a case study).34  I have yet to encounter 
literature that addresses the proliferation of the narco-culture in regions such as Colombia 
or Brazil.  This thesis recognizes the narco-culture as important for mobilization and 
coagulation within DTOs.  However, this cultural or sociological explanation falls short 
in establishing primal causation for the institutionalization of DTOs in the context of 
Colombia and Brazil.     
Lastly, some literature points to how DTOs proliferate via their growing linkages 
with groups and networks.  DTOs forge relationships with other actors and maintain a 
complex network to avoid detection and prosecution.  While linkages and networks do 
not cause institutionalization, increased interaction between DTOs and other actors in the 
social and political arena provide the context for institutionalization to occur.  Networks 
and linkages can be through insurgencies, weapons smugglers, or terrorist 
                                                 
32 See Humberto Lopez and Guillermo Perry, Inequality in Latin America: Determinants and 
Consequences, Policy Research Working Paper 4504, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (2008), 2–12 for 
aspect of inequality. 
33 See Alejandro Gaviria, “Social Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution in Latin America.” 
Economia (2007): 66–74 for social mobility parameters. 
34 Martin Meraz Garcia, “Narcoballads: The Psychology and Recruitment Process of the Narco,” 
Global Crime, (2006): 200–213; and Mark Cameron Edberg, El Narcotraficante: Narcocorridos and the 
Construction of a Cultural Persona on the U.S.-Mexico Border (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
2004).  
 14
organizations.35  These relationships can also be illustrated via ties with politicians and 
governmental or non-governmental organizations.36  Moreover, these ties are 
strengthened through the processes which DTOs are accepted as legitimate actors.  
Enrique Desmond Arias summarizes these ties in Drug and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: 
Trafficking, Social Networks & Public Security (2006) in the following excerpt:  
The persistence of trafficker power in this city emerges out of ongoing 
political relations that criminals maintain with civic actors and state 
officials through extensive and flexible illegal frameworks that help them 
to build the support and protection necessary to engage in long-term 
criminal activities.  By tying themselves into existing state and social 
networks, traffickers avail themselves of both governmental resources and 
existing social capital.37  
While networks and linkages provide insight into the operations of DTOs, this insight 
does not explicitly address the institutionalization of these organizations.  In contrast, 
how is the network dynamic illustrated in the Colombian case study?   
In the Colombian case, a myriad of actors are involved in drug trafficking.  Some 
insurgency groups in Colombia have co-opted drug trafficking as a financing means, 
hence the sometimes utilized “narco-insurgency” categorization.  Insurgencies do not 
control the whole of drug trafficking.  Rather, they often work in conjunction with 
decentralized cartels to ensure the continued financing and production of drugs.  In 
complimentary fashion, DTOs often rely on private security provided by insurgency 
groups or paramilitaries to ensure continued drug production.  The focus on burgeoning 
relationships and networks provide key insights to organizational theory and 
institutionalization as a process.  However, relationships and networks do not account for 
the whole of institutionalization, but merely illustrate a characteristic.  The manifestation 
                                                 
35 Pinheiro, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, Narcoterrorism in Latin America: A Brazilian Perspective, 
JSOU Report 06-04, Hurlburt Field, Florida: The Joint Special Operations University Press (2006): 1–3.  
36 Rensselaer W. Lee III, Francisco E. Thoumi, and Pimentel, “Chapter 3: Drugs and Democracy in 
Colombia,” In Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration Around the World, by Roy Godson, 
(New Brunswick; London, U.K.: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 71–97; and Enrique Desmond Arias, 
“Faith in Our Neighbors: Networks and Social Order in Three Brazilian Favelas,” Latin American Politics 
and Society (Spring 2004): 3–4. 
37 Enrique Desmond Arias, Drugs and Democracy in Rio De Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, & 
Public Security (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 2.  
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of relationships may attribute to variation across the Colombian and Brazilian case 
studies because both countries utilize networks and relationships in differing contexts.  
The next section discusses why Colombia and Brazil are chosen as case studies.  
D. CASE SELECTION 
Colombia and Brazil emerge as important cases because of the divergent 
circumstances in which DTOs operate, are institutionalized, and sustain themselves.  The 
nature of illicit drugs in Colombia is much more international, with a focus on catering to 
South America, North America, and Europe. Since Colombia is a producer of illicit 
drugs, and experiences an ongoing civil war within its drug producing regions, the 
emphasis of DTOs is control of territory and personnel to grow and process illicit crops.  
In Colombia, the production of illicit crops requires DTO alliances with armed groups 
that can provide extensive security in these regions.  Therefore, the nature of drug 
trafficking in a country with insurgency like Colombia suggests a DTO strategy that 
circumvents state-led efforts such as Plan Colombia.  Compared to Colombia the nature 
of illicit drugs in Brazil centers on consumption and distribution within favela zones; 
these zones have traditionally lacked significant state presence.  DTOs within Brazil’s 
favelas deal with illicit commodities without having to focus on cultivation or production, 
and hence do not rely on armed groups to control large territories or personnel to grow or 
process illicit crops.  Moreover, Brazil on the whole is not experiencing insurgency; the 
state exercises a larger state presence with exception of favela zones.  The lack of 
insurgency would suggest that drug trafficking organizations in Brazil are not required to 
adapt to all encompassing state-led counter-insurgency efforts, but focus on maintaining 
the drug trade in an insular urban environment (favelas) where the state lacks significant 
presence.  DTOs within the Brazilian context are much more focused on controlling 
access and points of sale for illicit drugs.  The next section expounds on why Colombia 
and Brazil were chosen by providing a historical context for the development of the drug 
trade and DTOs within the two countries.   
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1. The Colombian Context 
This section provides a brief look a the second half of the twentieth century in 
Colombia.38  This period was characterized by high levels of political violence and 
underpins violence as part of Colombia’s social and political landscape.  Moreover, the 
second half of the twentieth century provides the context in which DTOs emerged in 
Colombia. 
Frank Safford and Marco Palacios in Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided 
Society illustrate this political violence in four phases.39  The first phase is categorized by 
political partisanship that began in the electoral campaigns of 1945–1946 and ended in 
1953.  This period is highlighted by amnesty and pacification programs offered by 
General Rojas Pinilla.  It was this period that rooted violence as a mode of behavior.  The 
second phase is categorized by violence through partisan and factional networks (1954–
1964).  This period is highlighted by the struggle over coffee and land markets.  
Furthermore, this period witnesses mafia violence (violence as a form of criminal 
economic enterprise) and the precursors to guerrilla movements (armed struggles of 
agrarian and communist origin).  The third phase is categorized by guerrilla / 
revolutionary movements that started in the 1960s til the end of the 1980s (when the 
Soviet Union collapsed).  This period was spurred by the Cuban Revolution and 
insurgencies identified themselves as Leninist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and, the National Liberation Army Guevarist (ELN), or Maoist in nature.  The 
fourth phase began in the late 1980s and is categorized by insurrectional war, low-
intensity conflict, and mafia wars.  This period is highlighted by the intertwined nature of 
drug-trafficker, guerrilla, and paramilitary violence.  Furthermore, this violence is spurred 
by alliances and conflict among drug-traffickers, guerrillas, paramilitaries, politicians, 
land-owners, the military, and the police.  Policital violence as it pertains to  
 
                                                 
38 Susan Eva Eckstein, What Justice? Whose Justice? (Los Angeles, CA: University of California 
Press, 2003), 187. 
39 Information from pg. 15–17 is derived from Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia: 
Fragmented Land, Divided Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 345–352.  
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Colombia has been summarized; however, it is important to discern general political 
violence from violence associated with drug trafficking and violence associated with 
revolutionary struggle.   
La Violencia occurred between 1948–1958, revolutionary violence occurred in 
the mid 1960s, and violence associated drug trafficking emerged in the mid-1970s.  
While this brief synopsis of Colombian violence in the second half of the twentieth 
century provides broad context, explicit attention should be paid to the period of “mafia” 
violence, 1954–1964.  This period witnesses violence as proliferated in the context of 
criminal enterprise; furthermore, this period provides the essential precursor to violence 
associated with drug trafficking in the 1970s.  The next paragraph expounds on the period 
of “mafia” violence (1954–1964).   
The violence and bloodshed associated with the period of 1954–1964 progressed 
from earlier years of partisan violence and is know as “mafia” violence.  Violence during 
this period was viewed as an instrument (means) for economic gain (ends), and not 
political power.  During this period, struggle over land and property rights characterized 
conflicts.  Moreover, while land had always been a historical point of contention, land 
during this period was key in cattle and coffe production. The process involved many 
actors besides wealthy landowners, landowning companies and poor colonists, this period 
incorporated politicians, judges, and “powerbrokers”.  By powerbrokers, I refer to 
political bosses that controlled armed bands that emerged during this period.  These 
bands divied control of commodites such as stolen coffee and cattle.  It is important to 
note that these armed bands began establishing their own operations and rules and 
eventually broke from the political bosses that originally sactioned them.  This divide is 
not analyzed, but weaknesses and polarization between political parties, bosses, and these 
armed bands were subsequent to political developments.  Control of cattle and coffee 
were preliminary and eventually these armed bands moved to control more farmland 
through extortion and violence.  The heads of these armed groups or gangs came to be 
categorized as “rural mafiosos” that increasingly consolidated their power up until the 
1960s.  
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From the 1960s–1970s, Colombia observed some respite from violence through 
The National Front.  The National Front40 (1958–1974) was the initiative that staved off 
this growing power and provided relative stability until the 1970s.  However, subsequent 
to this period, a growing absence of civil and military authority fostered conditions for 
armed groups (eventually revolutionary guerrillas) to grow in numbers and control larger 
amounts of territory.41  The period of “mafia” style violence from 1954–1964 illustrates 
the preconditions (violence for economic gains and control of land) for DTOs that 
appeared in Colombia in the 1970s.  Cartels emerged and looked to control and 
consolidate large contested tracts of land for the production of illicit crops.  Furthermore, 
the “mafia” period (1954–1964) illustrates preconditions for armed bands and gangs in 
evolving to armed insurgent groups and later paramilitaries.        
A look at these periods provides the context for understanding historical violence 
in Colombia.  It gives us the intellectual “scaffolding” by looking at how these periods 
shaped DTOs, insurgencies, and paramilitares in their respective timeframes.   The next 
section looks at the history of Brazil’s favelas.  As stated earlier,  DTOs in Brazil operate 
within favelas and flourish in the environment that lacks significant state presence.  
Analyzing Brazil as a case study requires historical background on the development of 
favela zones. 
2. A Brief History of Brazil’s Favelas42 
This section highlights relevant observations and periods to provide historical 
context and contributing factors for the proliferation of the drug trade in Brazilian 
favelas.43  Preliminary understanding of DTOs within Brazil’s favelas requires a basic 
                                                 
40 The National Front (1958-1974) was a non-aggression pact between the two main political parties 
and sought to strengthen political institutions and provide political stability.  
41 Charles T. Call, From “partisan cleansing” to power-sharing?: Lessons for security from Colombia's 
national front, Stanford University, Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control (1995): 1.  
42 Information regarding periods of favela history are derived from Enrique Desmond Arias, Drugs 
and Democracy in Rio De Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, & Public Security (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 23–26.  
43 For a more concise history of Brazil refer to Colin M. MacLachlan, A History of Modern Brazil: 
The Past against the Future (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003); and Thomas E. Skidmore, 
Brazil: Five Centuries of Change Second Edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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background of the political and social development of favelas.  The story begins as Brazil 
entered the twentieth century and looked to modernize.  With the 1902 election of 
President Rodrigues Alves, Brazil undertook modernizing via extensive building projects 
and a public health campaign.  However, in an attempt attract foreign investment and 
appease prominent political forces, public health resources and building projects were 
diverted toward coastal cities and the traditional downtown area.  The favela shanty 
towns and interior poorer sections were left out of the modernizing projects.44  
Subsequently, the country dealt with regional dualism45 and inequality exacerbated by 
the onset of industrialization and modernization.  It should also be noted that in the urban 
centers of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, (as formal and legitimate sectors were saturated) 
most people worked in informal and service sectors.  “The informal sector included street 
peddlers, washerwomen, messenger-boys, prostitutes, petty thieves, and vagrant 
handymen…they were the target of regular police repression and received little mercy 
from the court system.”46  Informal markets have always existed as a source of income 
for the poor, as well as informal trade as a way to escape unemployment.  The way these 
informal sectors evolved in many parts of Brazil, nevertheless, developed some networks 
that became closed tied to organized crime, as well as informal rules.47  Throughout the 
twentieth century Brazil ran into economic problems and strains with the primary export 
earners of coffee and natural rubber.  These problems and subsequent economic policies 
made it increasingly difficult to close the gap of equity among its citizens.  This brief 
snap shot of Brazil prior to the Estado Novo (1930–1945) illustrates some of the 
conditions that plagued Brazil as a whole and gives context to founding conditions within  
 
 
                                                 
44 Thomas E. Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries of Change Second Edition (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 82.  
45 Regional dualism refers to inequities in infrastructure and resources among varying regions within a 
country.  
46 Thomas E. Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries of Change Second Edition (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 90. 
47 Luiz de Andrade Filho, “The dynamics of drug-related organized crime and corruption in Brazil 
from a development perspective,” Journal of Financial Crime (2008): 55.  
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the favelas.  Subsequent paragraphs illustrates political development within the favelas 
from 1930–1988; these time periods encapsulate political change that leads up to the 
massive influx of illicit drugs in the 1980s.  
The Estado Novo (1930–1945) may be described as a period of state 
corporatism48 in which the government tried to extend limited citizenship.  For the most 
part, the government failed to incorporate the poor populations living in the favelas. 
The government saw favelas as aberrations within the modern city, 
refused to list  them on city maps, and slated them for removal.  Rio’s 
government proposed eliminating the favela problem by strictly regulating 
the expansion of existing favelas and removing citizens to parques 
proletarios, a closed, state-administered form of popular housing with 
strict curfews.  The Vargas administration built ties to parque residents by 
providing limited assistance and hosting social events.  Eventually, 
authorities expelled residents from some parques where land values had 
increased to make way for higher-income housing.49  
During the second republic (1945–1964), favelas grew via migration linked to the 
onset of industrialization.  During this period, the state tried to extend services to 
residents or try to remove the favelas.  However, the state rarely interacted directly with 
the communities in the favelas, and with the absence of a state presence internal to the 
favelas, informal groups began emerging to garner resources, provide security, and 
resolve disputes.  As autonomy within the favelas grew, the Catholic Church encouraged 
residency associations (AMs) to help manage these communities.  This period also 
coincided with Brazil’s first experience with competitive electoral democracy.  From the 
1950s on, politicians began supplanting church groups by working with AMs to garner 
political support.  In the 1960s, Carlos Lacerda’s military dictatorship began waging a 
war on the favelas (war, meaning removal) utilizing federal troops to remove the 
residents. 
                                                 
48 State corporatism refers to the theory and practice of organizing the whole of society into corporate 
entities subordinate to the state.  
49 Enrique Desmond Arias, Drugs and Democracy in Rio De Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, & 
Public Security (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 23.  
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During the military dictatorship (1964–1978), the state sought to oppress, remove 
and relocate favela residents.  Concurrently, the state continued to utilize residency 
associations (now better organized and larger) as intermediaries and distributors of aid.  
Many of these residency associations opposed government tactics through passive 
resistance.  Moreover, relocation efforts by the government of favela residents were 
nullified by continued migration patterns into the favelas.  This period was characterized 
by a burgeoning system of internal governance within the favelas (with informal 
leadership, including drug runners and a range of community leaders), a continued lack 
of resources, state oppression, and rise in violence and crime.  
The period of democratization (1978–1988) brought about a less oppressive and 
confrontational arena for favela dynamics.  The return of electoral competition also 
encouraged a return to clientelistic politics.   This period is characterized by political 
consolidation on the part of the state as well within the favelas.   Residency agencies 
reorganized to make demands on the government, while the government tried to 
outmaneuver the associations by delivering services directly to residents.  As the 
government centralized its distribution of resources to residents, the power of residency 
organizations diminished.  Moreover, favela communities themselves became divided 
while vying and competing for government aid.50  These periods highlight the founding 
dynamics for favelas as communities within the Brazilian political and social landscape.  
Moreover, these periods lay the groundwork for the context which DTOs operate within 
Brazil’s favelas. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis proceeds in three main chapters.  Chapter II, (Colombian DTOs: 
Origins and Institutional Analysis) analyzes DTOs in Colombia and looks at two facets in 
particular.  First, when and how did DTOs emerge in Colombia?  As is well known, 
DTOs emerged as prominent drug cartels in the 1970s.  However, answering how DTOs 
emerged in Colombia requires analysis prior to the 1970s because important roots and 
                                                 
50 Enrique Desmond Arias, Drugs and Democracy in Rio De Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, & 
Public Security (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 27–30.  
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precursors were established prior to this era.  Moreover, drug cultivation, production and 
distribution in Colombia existed prior to the emergence of major drug cartels.  Drug 
cultivation, production and distribution in Colombia existed prior to the emergence of 
major drug cartels.  Second, this chapter illustrates how Colombian DTOs meet the 
criteria for being informal institutions.  The characteristics of structural composition, 
stability, behavioral control, and social cohesion are utilized in assessing Colombian 
DTOs as informal institutions.  
Chapter III (Brazilian DTOs: Origins and Institutional Analysis) analyzes DTOs 
within Brazil’s favelas and looks at two facets in particular.  First, when and how did 
DTOs become rooted in Brazilian favelas?  Preliminary research points out that the 
burgeoning drug trade (and networks) of the 1980s linked up with pre-existing criminal 
networks and loosely organized gangs in Brazil.  Second, this chapter illustrates how 
Brazilian DTOs meet the criteria for being institutions based on four characteristics.  The 
characteristics of structural composition, stability, behavioral control, and social cohesion 
are utilized in assessing Brazilian DTOs as informal institutions.  Within the chapter, 
comparisons are drawn, and similarities and differences are illustrated between 
Colombian and Brazilian DTOs in how they emerged and are characterized as informal 
institutions.  
Chapter IV (DTOs: What Sustains Them?); this chapter illustrates what sustains 
Colombian and Brazilian DTOs as informal institutions.  Sustainability in the Colombian 
case study is attributed to competitive adaptation.  Sustainability in the Brazilian case 
study is attributed to networks; specifically, DTOs entrench and empower themselves as 
legitimate actors through informal social networks.  The essential takeaway is to 
understand what holistically sustains DTOs in their respective and distinct contexts.  
Colombia is shaped by internal conflict and its role as a producer country.  Therefore, the 
drug dynamic in Colombia places emphasis on control of land for drug production.  
Brazil on the other hand does not experience internal conflict and is not a producer 
country.  Therefore, the drug dynamic in Brazil places emphasis on controlling internal 
dynamics of favela zones.  Within the chapter, comparisons are drawn, and similarities 
and differences are illustrated between Colombian and Brazilian DTOs in what sustains 
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them as informal institutions.  These similarities and differences are key facets in 
understanding the divergent paths DTOs by which DTOs emerge, operate as institutions, 
and are sustained.  
Chapter V concludes the thesis by emphasizing the comparisons drawn between 
DTOs in Colombia and Brazil.  Also, based on conclusions gained from analysis, 
recommendations are given to mitigate the proliferation of drug trafficking organizations 
in Colombia and Brazil.  
 24
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II. COLOMBIAN DTOS: ORIGINS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter analyzes DTOs in Colombia and looks at two facets in particular.  
First, when and how did DTOs emerge in Colombia?  DTOs emerged as prominent drug 
cartels in the 1970s.  As already noted, however, answering how DTOs emerged in 
Colombia requires analysis prior to the 1970s because important roots and precursors 
were established prior to this era.  Second, this chapter illustrates how Colombian DTOs 
meet the criteria for being informal institutions.  The characteristics of structural 
composition, stability, behavioral control, and social cohesion are utilized in assessing 
Colombian DTOs as informal institutions.  The first section looks at when and how 
DTOs emerged in Colombia. 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF COLOMBIAN DTOS 
DTOs emerged as prominent cartels in the 1970s and came to be codified by the 
“super-cartels” of Medellin and Cali.  These organizations were headed by Pablo Escobar 
(Medellin) and the Rodriquez brothers (Cali); at the height of operations, (mid-1970s to 
1980s) these organizations were thought to have controlled a majority of the illicit 
cocaine trade, amounting to more than one hundred tons per year.  However, it is 
important to note that these organizations transformed and “upped the stakes” on a 
business that previously existed.  It is through organizational evolution, reckless 
ambition, and unbridled violence that the often irregular shipments of a few kilos turned 
into hundreds of thousands of kilos in illicit drug trafficking.   
What conditions laid the groundwork for the emergence of DTOs as prominent 
cartels in the 1970s?  Paul Gootenberg points out in his article, “The Pre-Colombian Era 
of Drug Trafficking in the Americas” (2007) that a new class of international cocaine 
traffickers manifested between 1947 and 1964.51  Peruvians, Bolivians, Chileans, 
Cubans, Mexicans, Brazilians, and Argentines effectively pioneered the drug trade 
                                                 
51 Information for pages 24–25 is derived from Paul Gootenberg, “The Pre-Colombian Era of Drug 
Trafficking in the Americas,” The Americas (2007): 133–176; and Andean Cocaine: The Making of a 
Global Drug (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
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through the 1940s.  Through the 1950s, couriers began smuggling cocaine from Peru, and 
by the 1960s the drug trade had effectively exploded.  The 1960s witnessed the cross-
connection of coca farmers, labs, distributors, and a burgeoning retail market.  
Gootenberg expounds on the origins of the trade by analyzing the growing network of 
traffickers, chemists and coca-growing peasants.52  He asserts that this group of people 
constituted new clandestine markets which created local conditions for the drug trade to 
grow.  Often the precursor to the 1970s boom in illicit trafficking is overlooked by casual 
observers; it is important to recognize that founding conditions for DTOs were laid prior 
to the “war on drugs.”53  DTOs in Colombia were not sporadic entities that sprang up 
overnight; DTOs were more akin to organic, evolving entities that happen to finally catch 
the prominent attention of the public following the 1970s.  Moreover, beyond the cross-
connection of coca farmers, labs, distributors, and the burgeoning retail market, it is 
important to note the shift of coca production within the Andes and how it relates to 
Colombia.  
Colombia’s geographic proximity and likeness to other South American drug 
producing countries made production feasible.  It is also important to note that state-led 
efforts to crack down on illicit crops in countries like Peru and Bolivia in the 1990s 
shifted cocaine trafficking northward to countries like Colombia and Mexico.  This shift 
within the Andes in production facilitated the conditions for Colombia to become a 
production, trafficking, and distribution country of illegal cocaine.  Furthermore, the 
transition of the illicit market to Colombian DTOs was exacerbated by the emergence of  
right-wing military regimes that stifled other smuggling routes; notably, the Chiliean 
coup of 1973 resulted in the closing of the most traveled route of illicit cocaine northward  
By the 1970s, DTOs came to codify the cocaine trade and prominent DTOs, such as the 
Medellin and Cali cartel, essentially leveraged a pre-existing network to profit on 
exploding North American demand during the 1970s.  As market demand for illicit 
cocaine rose in the 1970s, rapid power consolidation and organizational adaptation was 
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observed by these organizations.  The pre-cursors to the drug trade in Colombia have 
been briefly discussed, while having noted the shift of cocaine cultivation and 
distribution within the Andes from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia.   The next paragraph 
elaborates on the emergence of Colombian DTOs from the 1970s to 1990s.   
DTOs in the 1970s through the 1990s were characterized through centralized 
cartels, and these organizations are characterized by their transnational scope of 
influence, increasingly larger operations, and increasing vertical integration.  While drug 
trafficking had previously existed, DTO leadership (Pablo Escobar of Medellin Cartel, 
and Rodriguez brothers of Cali Cartel) facilitated organizational evolution.  DTOs 
increased their vertical integration by linking coca growers to laboratories to distribution 
networks in the Caribbean and the United States.  Growing U.S. demand, coupled with 
the profit margin afforded by cocaine fostered illicit growth and DTO innovation during 
this period.  This growth was guided under the leadership of prominent cartel figures that 
exploited experiences and connections that were previously developed.54  From the 1970s 
to the 1990s, Colombian DTOs accumulated land and resources.  It was also during this 
period that centralized DTOs in the form of cartels had to compete with each other while 
dealing with a burgeoning insurgency and subsequent paramilitary organizations.  This 
period witnessed the formation of relationships between centralized DTOs, insurgencies, 
and paramilitaries.  The 1990s witnessed the decline of prominent cartels.  Before 
insurgencies and paramilitaries are analyzed, it is important to highlight the decline of 
prominent cartels.  Subsequent to the decline of major cartels, DTOs became 
decentralized and thus interacted with insurgencies and paramilitaries in a different 
context.   
While Colombian cartels fought each other and guerrillas, turf wars were 
concurrently fought in the United States in cities like Miami and New York during the 
1970s and 1980s.  The increasing violence drew the attention of policy makers within the 
United States who in turn mounted increasing pressure on Colombia.  Various cartels 
were subsequently prosecuted and brought down by the state with the help of 
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and Social Change (July 2003): 47.  
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intelligence, inter-cartel rivalries, and inter-state cooperation.  These factors thus 
culminated in the fall of Pablo Escobar and the Medellin cartel in 1993 and the fall of the 
Cali Cartel in 1999.55  Since the fall of these cartels, it is important to note that drug 
trafficking in Colombia did not stop, having in fact continued through decentralized 
operations.  The vacuum left by prosecution left cartels to reorganize; and while 
operations continued in a decentralized manner, practices, norms and institutional 
characteristics were carried forth and shaped DTOs well into the 1990s and beyond.  
Moreover, DTOs formed relations and power dynamics with guerrilla movements and 
paramilitary organizations.   
It was during the 1970s–1990s that cartels came into contact and conflict with 
guerrilla revolutionaries.  The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 
National Liberation Army (ELN)56 was affected by the entrance of narco-traffickers into 
rural and frontier regions settled under guerrillas influence.  In turn, alliances and conflict 
(centered on control of territory) ensued between the guerrillas and DTOs.  Moreover, in 
the 1990s, the FARC became entrenched in the cultivation of illicit drugs due to 
converging factors such as the shift of coca production from Peru, the absence of 
traditional agricultural production, and rising rural unemployment.  Subsequently, the 
narcotics industry moved into zones controlled by the FARC.  In looking at guerrilla 
organizations, such as the FARC, ELN,57 and various other groups formed in the 1960s–
1980s, the basis of mobilization for these groups center around clientelistic control of 
local government, people, and territory.  Moreover, “It is said that the movement of coca 
cultivators in 1996 (into FARC controlled zones) would not have reached the size, 
intensity, and influence withough the dedicated support of the FARC.”58   
                                                 
55 Keith Maguire, “The Rise and Fall of Pablo Escobar and the Medellin Cartel,” The Criminologist 
(1998): 104–107; and Serrano Cadena and Rosso Jose, “Capturing the Cali Cartel: Selections from Jaque 
Mate,” Crime, Law, and Social Change (July 2003): 58–59. 
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58 Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society (Oxford: Oxford 
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Paramilitaries, too, fit centrally into the drug trade in Colombia.  Paramilitaries 
originated as private protection units that serviced rural groups with vested interest in 
protecting their lands.59  In the 1980s, these groups received patronage from both the 
government as well as DTOs.  Guiteirrez and Ramirez in Politics in the Andes (2004) 
explain this patronage on the part of the government as a hard-line military strategy 
against insurgency.60  Drug traffickers and paramilitaries were willing allies in taking the 
fight to insurgencies outside the legal system.  Paramilitary groups also received 
patronage from drug traffickers (cartels) because DTOs sought to protect themselves 
from guerrilla movements, other cartels, and state prosecution.  In many cases, drug 
traffickers bought land in rural regions and either took control of paramilitary groups or 
co-opted them.  Besides fighting insurgency groups, DTOs shaped their mission to 
include fighting rival cartels and the counter-narcotics arm of the state.  DTOs organized, 
equipped, and trained paramilitary units in the art of counter-insurgency at schools like 
the one located at Puerto Boyaca.  Concurrently in the 1980s, under the auspices of 
supporting military forces against insurgents, the paramilitaries “brutalized and 
intimidated the local population into abandoning many rural regions.”61  Paramilitaries 
subsequently controlled greater amounts of land and expanded their power due to links 
with the drug trade and patronage from both DTOs and the government.  Major cartels 
were dismantled in the 1990s, and paramilitaries subsequently faced diminished 
resources and patronage.  However, many paramilitaries reorganized under the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 1997 and had already become heavily 
involved in illicit commercial activities that included the drug trade.62  
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The preceding paragraphs looked at founding conditions for the drug trade (prior 
to 1970s), the proliferation of DTOs from the 1970s to 1990s, as well as DTO links 
between insurgency groups and paramilitaries.  The essential takeaway is that DTOs have 
operated in Colombia since the 1970s and have adapted to new actors such as insurgency 
groups and paramilitaries.  Drug trafficking in Colombia manifested via DTOs, narco-
insurgency conflicts or alliancess, and narco-paramilitary alliances.  This chapter takes 
into account these specific relationships to illustrate the changing face of DTOs in 
Colombia.  While state-led efforts weakened centralized DTOs in the 1990s, subsequent 
decentralized DTOs incorporated insurgencies and paramilitaries.  Moreover, 
insurgencies and paramilitaries sinced the 1990s are constituted as DTOs due to their 
involvement in the illicit drug trade.  Because of this shift, policy and intitiatives have 
been shaped to account for insurgency, counter-narcotics, as well as paramilitary 
demobilization.  The next section illustrates how drug trafficking organizations operate as 
institutions within Colombia based on four characteristics.  These characteristics are 
structural composition, stability, behavioral control, and social cohesion. 
B. COLOMBIAN DTOS AS INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
This section outlines how Colombian DTOs qualify as informal institutions.  
Understanding how DTOs qualify as informal institutions enhances the understanding of 
these organizations on three levels: first how they emerge, second, how DTOs are 
characterized, and finally how DTOs sustain themselves as viable institutional entities.  
Morover, DTOs undergo the process of institutionalization through entrenchment and 
development of the institutional  characteristics these organizations display.  These 
characteristics comprise of structural composition, stability, behavioral control, and social 
cohesion and are expounded upon in subsequent sections. 
1. Structurally Connected to Society63 
First, DTOs are a structural feature of Colombian society.  Colombia has often 
been described as a society divided between the small elite who owned a majority of 
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Pablo Escobar and the Medellin Cartel.” The Criminologist (1998): 95–107. 
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property and wealth and the majority who did not own much.64  During the height of drug 
cartels in Colombia (1970s–1990s), DTOs rapidly became new and powerful structural 
features of society.  These organizations controlled land, people, and affected the political 
process within Colombia.   Moreover, DTOs forged relations with the public based on 
fear and reciprocity.   One example is derived from the Medellin cartel; Pablo Escobar 
(the leader of the cartel) used his wealth to further his criminal enterprise while also 
pushing a pro-poor populist agenda.  He spent money on infrastructure projects such as 
water supply, electricity, sanitation, and built a substantial number of housing units for 
the poor and homeless in Colombia.  To further curry favor, he spent money on sport 
facilities (namely the popular sport of soccer) while even investing in a zoo.  These 
activities bought a large amount of local support and good will, which in turn persuaded 
the public to accept some of his organization’s illicit activities.  In fact, a number of 
public opinion surveys conducted during the Medellin era (1970s–1990s) showed that the 
general public viewed drug trafficking in Colombia as secondary to other problems they 
faced.65  Subsequent to the fall of prominent cartels, insurgency groups, such as the 
FARC and paramilitary groups, gained political capital among the poor by employing 
similar practices.66  Structural composition as an institutional parameter of DTOs also 
takes into account interactions and connections within society.  The next paragraph 
highlights these interaction and connections.   
DTOs have proliferated in spite of the fall of major cartels in the 1990s; as 
illustrated earlier, insurgencies and paramilitaries have been incorporated into drug 
trafficking and display cooperation and competition with decentralized DTOs.  The 
linkages between DTOs and these groups indicates that from a societal perspective, drug 
trafficking is a persevering phenomenon.  Drug trafficking was not exclusive to nefarious 
entities such as DTOs, as it proliferated it incorporated a myriad of social actors.  In this 
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context, the drug trafficking market ties rural peasants, DTOs, insurgencies, and 
paramilitaries together in the Colombian social landscape.  The presence of DTOs in 
Colombia since the 1970s and their sustained interactions among varying groups within 
society (i.e., citizens, insurgencies, and paramilitaries) illustrate one institutional 
parameter, that DTOs are a structural feature of society.    
2. Stability 
Stability is also an institutional characteristic that DTOs have displayed over time.  
In the Colombian case, DTOs and precursors to DTOs, have operated since the 1950s and 
have remained a fixture on the country’s historical landscape.  Furthermore, DTOS have 
operated in varying contexts to achieve the same end, illicit drug production and 
distribution for the international market.  To correctly quantify the stability aspect of 
Colombian DTOs, one has to observe drug operations over time in varying contexts.  
Subsequent paragraphs highlight stability in the case of Colombian DTOs. 
From a stability standpoint, DTOs have delivered illicit drugs to market since the 
1970s and have done so in varying contexts.  First of all, DTOs leveraged pre-existing 
networks to facilitate the drug trade from rudimentary beginnings from the 1950s 
onward.  The demise of prominent cartels in the 1990s left the drug trade open to 
decentralized cartels, as well as other groups, such as insurgencies and paramilitaries.  
Peceny and Durnan in “The FARC’s Best Friend” (2006) have argued that the 
strengthening of the FARC during the 1990s was an unintended consequence of 
successes in U.S. antidrug policies.  The dismantling of the Medellin and Cali drug 
cartels was the first step.  Furthermore, measures such as aggressive coca interdiction and 
eradication, as well as U.S. pressure on the Colombian state to crack down on cartels 
created essentially pushed coca cultivation to FARC dominated rural areas.   As a 
consequence, the FARC and ELN have strengthened themselves through the drug trade.67   
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Moreover, Colombian DTOs adapted to counter-narcotic approaches by the state through 
linkages with insurgencies and paramilitaries, the following paragraphs outline the role of 
insurgencies in the drug trade.     
Buckwalter and Struckman in “Colombia: Mission Impossible” (2007) highlight 
how DTOs have adjusted in the context of civil war.68  The authors argue that the FARC 
and ELN not only tax cocaine producers, but are directly involved in production and 
trafficking, with two-thirds of FARC fronts and one-third of ELN fronts deriving income 
from the drug trade.  The authors also argue that U.S.–Colombian efforts in dismantling 
the Cali and Medellin organizations enhanced guerrilla-trafficker and paramilitary-
trafficker relationships.  Moreover, these relationships have made targeting and 
identification more difficult.  These examples illustrate DTOs operating in one context, 
that of decentralized cartels and successful relationships with insurgencies and 
paramilitaries.  However, from a stability standpoint, it is also important to address DTO 
operations in the context of weakened insurgencies and paramilitaries because literature 
and analysis has emerged in this respect, the next paragraph highlights the changing 
condition of weakened insurgencies. 
U.S.–Colombian efforts in the form of Plan Colombia has shown considerable 
success in the areas of reducing violence, weakening the FARC insurgency, advancing 
the peace process, enhancing government, growing the economy, and providing more 
social services.69  Moreover, state-led counter-insurgency (COIN) operations and 
worsening conditions for insurgency groups have significantly weakened them.  A 2008 
article in a Colombian journal argued that the FARC’s financial position had deteriorated 
dramatically in this period with its income falling to nearly forty percent compared to 
earlier in the decade.70  Furthermore, the bulk of profits from the illicit drug trade remain 
largely with transit countries like Mexico, while revenue from other activities such as 
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kidnapping and extortion has declined.71  Moreover, the FARC’s loss of territorial (as 
measured by the number of attacks against the Colombian military) was down by forty 
percent by this time.72  Another example of the FARC’s decline is illustrated in the July 
2008 rescue of fifteen hostages.  In this instance, the Colombian military successfully and 
bloodlessly tricked the FARC into releasing their hostages.  This operation was touted as 
a Colombian—U.S. success that showcased inter-state cooperation and growing 
Colombian military professionalism.73  
Despite these examples of the strengthening and weakening of insurgencies, it is 
important to keep in mind the end state.  Drug production remains relatively high and 
goals set forth in the arena of counter-drug policy have not been met.  Plan Colombia’s 
goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by fifty 
percent in six years was not met.  From 2000 to 2006, coca production increased by 
fifteen percent.74  This assessment illustrates that despite the linking of guerrilla 
movements and drug organizations, the weakening of revolutionary groups does not 
indicate a weakening of DTOs in Colombia.  As alluded to earlier, the end  state for 
institutional stability regarding DTOs is illicit drugs making it to the market in varying 
contexts.  On the one hand, insurgencies such as the FARC and ELN are conduits and 
partners in the drug trade; moreover,  these organizations utilize the drug trade to 
strenghthen themselves.  On the other hand, we observe a weakening of these 
insurgencies which can be attributed to a variety of factors.  In the end, reports indicate 
that drug production and distribution is still a major issue.75  Despite the above 
                                                 
71 “Colombia politics: Free at last,” EIU ViewsWire (July 2008).    
72 Ibid. 
73 June S Beittel, Colombia: Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress: RL 32250, Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service (2009): 9.  
74 Richard G. Lugar, Plan Colombia: Elements for Success. Staff Trip Report, Washington, D.C.: 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, (December 2005): 5; Peter DeShazo, Tanya 
Primiani, and Phillip McLean, Back from the Brink: Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1999-2007, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.: CSIS (Novermber 2007), x; and GAO, Plan 
Colombia: Drug reduction goals were not fully met, but security has improved; U.S. agencies need more 
detailed plans for reducing assistance, GAO Report 09-71, Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability 
Office (October 2008): 4. 
75 June S Beittel, Colombia: Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress: RL 32250, Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service (2009): 20.  
 35
observations in relation to insurgencies such as the FARC, it is clear that the DTOs in 
general still traffic illicit commodities.  The next paragraph looks at the developments of 
paramilitaries, as these organizations have been tied to drug trafficking organizations as 
well.  
Some studies allude to the demobilization of paramilitary groups such as the 
United Self-Defense forces of Colombia (AUC).76  Between 2003 and 2006, Colombia 
implemented a massive demobilization process and the government claimed the 
successful demobilization of 30,000 personnel.  However, since then, new groups may 
have emerged, and have taken over criminal operations previously run by the AUC.  
Successor groups have emerged as criminal gangs who service drug trafficking by 
providing security and violence.  Successor groups are differntiated from their 
predecessors in that for one, they have not formed a binding ideology, or identifiable 
coalition.  Second, leadership within these groups are less visible and are not readily 
identified.  Third, these groups focus less on counter-insurgency and more on criminal 
activites such as drug trafficking, extortion, and money laundering.  Government sources 
often cite links between these successor groups and insurgency groups to facilitate drug 
trafficking, and there is growing evidence that successor groups have positioned 
themselves to compete with insurgency groups over drug territory.77  The convergence of 
the observations compiled in the preceding paragraphs illustrate that DTOs and drug 
trafficking has remained stable.  Colombian DTOs have provided illicit drugs to the 
international market despite fluctuations and varying contexts such as the dismantling of 
centralized drug cartels, and the strengenthing / weakening of insurgencies and 
paramilitaries.  The next section discusses behavior control as applied to Colombian 
DTOs. 
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3. Internally Disciplined 
Another institutional characteristic is behavioral control; behavioral control is 
described as placing expectations and rules on members within an institution.  DTOs 
impose limits on their members and affect individual behavior through retribution and 
accountability.  In the Colombian case, cartel leadership reinforced rules via violent 
killings or through bribes.  “As the amounts of money and contraband grew, so did the 
need to enforce discipline, punish enemies, collect debts and bribe officials.  Kidnapping 
or even killing someone who had cheated him (Pablo Escobar) not only kept the books 
balanced, it sent a message.”78  In more decentralized drug operations, Colombian DTOs 
have systems of verticle and horizontal accountability.  “If something goes wrong with a 
transaction, relations of informal accountability ensure that participating nodes (cells of 
operation) will answer to the core, protecting leaders and investors from theft and other 
uncertainties.”79  Because DTOs operate in illicit and hostile environments, they do not 
publish rules, norms, or practices.  These organizations operate under informal 
understandings, with an implied understanding of how things operate.  A former drug 
pilot put it like this, “we never said be carful, or if you go this far you are going to be 
dead…you didn’t have to say it, it was implicit.”80  Moreover, many DTO recruits are 
asked to provide personal information such as family contact information so as to prevent 
them from going to authorities for fear of reprisal.81  These examples highlight 
behavioral control as an institutional parameter applied to Colombian DTOs.  The next 
section discusses social cohesion as an institutional parameter. 
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4. Internally Cohesive   
Lastly, a shared sense of values among members identifies an institution. These 
shared sense of values may also strengthen the institution.  Drug trafficking organizations 
share ideals, beliefs, and values which may culminate in a common social identity.  The 
recruitment of individuals into DTOs may be predicated on the need for power, 
belonging, respect, security and pride.  This assesment requires social context, and to 
illustrate the social context in which members of Colombian DTOs as well as  citizens 
lived, it is pertinent to highlight certain historical periods in Colombia. 
As was noted earlier, during the second half of the twentieth century (1945 and 
beyond),  Colombia was, above all else, characterized by rampant and ongoing political 
violence.82  Frank Safford and Marco Palacios in Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided 
Society (2002) illustrate this political violence in four phases.83  The first phase is 
categorized by political partisanship that began in the electoral campaigns of 1945–1946 
and ended in 1953.  This period is highlighted by amnesty and pacification programs 
offered by General Rojas Pinilla.  It was this period that rooted violence as a mode of 
behavior.   
The second phase is categorized by violence through partisan and factional 
networks (1954–1964).  This period is highlighted by the struggle over coffee and land 
markets.  Furthermore, this period witnesses mafia violence (violence as a form of 
criminal economic enterprise) and the precursors to guerrilla movements (armed 
struggles of agrarian and communist origin).   
The third phase is categorized by guerrilla / revolutionary movements that started 
in the 1960s til the end of the 1980s (when the Soviet Union collapsed).  This period was 
spurred by the Cuban Revolution and insurgencies identified themselves as Leninist 
(FARC), Guevarist (ELN), or Maoist in nature.   
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The fourth phase began in the late 1980s and is categorized by insurrectional war, 
low-intensity conflict, and mafia wars.  This period is highlighted by the intertwined 
nature of drug-trafficker, guerrilla, and paramilitary violence.  Furthermore, this violence 
is spurred by alliances and conflict among drug-traffickers, guerrillas, paramilitaries, 
politicians, land-owners, the military, and the police.    Partisan violence occurred 
between 1948–1958, revolutionary violence occurred in the mid 1960s, and violence 
associated drug trafficking emerged in the mid-1970s.   
These periods of time provide context in understanding historical violence in 
Colombia.  Across the spectrum of participants, whether they be drug-runners, guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, police, armed forces, or average citizens, violence has been a part of the 
political identity and social context in the second half of the twentieth century.  As 
Colombia went through La Violencia (1948–1958), society witnessed a continuation of 
the tradition of lawlessness.  The rise of cartels in the 1970s had been precipitated in an 
environment where violent gangs ruled the ghettos.  “The gangs lived by an almost 
nihilistic code of fatalism, violence, and early death.  They found it easy to recruit new 
members because of the continual influx of new immigrants to the cities.”84  A shared 
sense of values was formed during this period for drug trafficking members in Colombia.  
For clarity, it is important to remember that the roots of late-twentieth violence pre-dated 
violence associated with drug trafficking.  Drug violence tapped into brooding social and 
political conflicts that had been underlying, sometimes surfacing and sometimes deferred 
for decades.85  As bloodshed associated with drug-trafficking in the 1970s ensued, this 
perpetual cycle of violence further engendered norms which were rooted in violence.   
From a different perspective, violence is not the only aspect of shared norms and 
ideals for DTO members.  Many ties within DTOs are familial in nature, these ties 
necessitated trust for illiict operations and engendered a brotherhood within the 
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organization.86  From an organizational standpoint, DTOs operate on a myriad of levels; 
while a coca farmer may not identify with a cartel captain, common identities may be 
formed by specialization in trade.  Traffickers identify themselves as part of a specific 
cell or job description, i.e., distribution, transportation, or production.  Moreover, 
interviews with DTO members illustrate claims of kinship via friendhips, geographic ties, 
or specific job skills.87  It is also important to note that in looking at the social base for 
drug traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitaries, there is commonality.  These groups draw 
from “localities with the same kind of socioeconomic profile.”88  In short, the history of 
endemic violence coupled with a familial sense of connection among DTO members 
provides the basis for social cohesion.  Colombian DTOs have been briefly codified in 
institutional analysis via structural compostion, stability, behavioral control, and social 
cohesion.  The next section summarizes findings and observations from the chapter.   
C. CONCLUSION  
This chapter analyzed DTOs in Colombia and looked at two facets in particular.  
First, when and how did DTOs emerge in Colombia?  DTOs emerged as prominent drug 
cartels in the 1970s and have adapted to new actors such as insurgency groups and 
paramilitaries.  Drug trafficking subsequent to the fall of major cartels in the 1970s 
manifested via decentralized DTOs, narco-insurgency conflicts or alliancess, and narco-
paramilitary alliances.  Moreover, the chapter noted that state-led efforts to crack down 
on illicit crops in countries like Peru and Bolivia in the 1990s shifted cocaine trafficking 
northward to countries like Colombia.  This shift within the Andes in production as well 
as political conditions within the state facilitated the conditions for Colombia to become a 
production, trafficking, and distribution country of illegal cocaine.  Moreover, because of 
the cultivaiton and distribution aspect, Colombia drug trafficking focuses on the control 
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of drug producing land and distributing iliicit drugs on the international market.  Second, 
this chapter illustrated how Colombian DTOs meet the criteria for being informal 
institutions.  The characteristics of structural composition, stability, behavioral control, 
and social cohesion were utilized in assessing Colombian DTOs as informal institutions.  
This chapter provided a basis for comparison with Brazil in how DTOs emerged, and are 





III. BRAZILIAN DTOS: ORIGINS AND INSTITUIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter analyzes DTOs in Brazil’s favelas and looks at two facets in 
particular.  First, when and how did DTOs emerge in Brazil’s favelas?  By most accounts, 
DTOs did not really emerge in Brazil’s favelas until the 1980s.  At the same time, 
research points out that the burgeoning drug trade (and networks) of the 1980s linked up 
with pre-existing criminal networks and loosely organized gangs in Brazil.  Second, this 
chapter illustrates how Brazilian DTOs meet the criteria for being, and are best 
understood as informal institutions.  Structural composition, stability, behavioral control, 
and social cohesion are utilized and found to be useful for assessing Brazilian DTOs as 
informal institutions.  Furthermore, comparisons are made between the Colombia and 
Brazil case studies with regards to how DTOs emerge as informal institutions.  The first 
section looks at when and how DTOs emerged in Brazil’s favelas. 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF BRAZILIAN DTOS 
DTOs emerged in Brazil’s favelas in the 1980s following the influx of illicit drugs 
into the region.  Before elaborating on how Brazilian DTOs emerged, this section looks at 
the pre-existing conditions and considerations that laid the groundwork for the emergence 
of Brazilian DTOs in the 1980s.  Brazil shares a porous and largely unpatrolled western 
border with Bolivia and Peru, contains dense jungle terrain, has sea access via coastal 
ports, and houses major metropolitan areas such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.  Brazil 
also contains favelas that are predominantly built on steep hillsides; these communities 
provide ideal places to hide drugs and arms and are in close proximity to prominent ports 
and tourist hubs, such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.89  The combination of increasing 
cocaine consumption in Rio and Sao Paulo (1950s onward), the general lack of police 
efforts, and weakened central authority during the Goulart era (1961–1964) created 
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conditions for Brazil to become a prominent cocaine transit area.90 Because of these 
conditions, Brazil emerged as a prominent route for illicit cocaine to North America and 
Europe in the 1960s.  However, the 1964 military regime stifled drug trafficking and 
proliferation; the regime essentially had the same effect as the 1973 Chilean coup in 
blunting drug routes.91  The next paragraphs disucuss the prevalence of pre-existing 
gangs and how these gangs developed into the DTOs of Brazil.      
Prior to the expansion of the drug trade into favelas, “bicheiros (number 
runners)92 played a significant role in administering a drug trade dominated by small 
scale marijuana sales; and these were isolated from mainstream favela life.”93  Moreover, 
violent non-state actors were already prevalent in the favelas and were characterized as 
gangs.  In the 1970s, these gangs took shape and became organized through the prison 
system.  It has been hypothesized that common criminals were housed with political 
prisoners (guerrillas), and through interaction, organizational strategies were taught and 
transferred.94  This organizational basis was the beginning of the formation of more 
powerful gangs and the strengthening of already loosely organized gangs into DTOs.   
An example is derived from the group known as Comando Vermelho (Red 
Command or CV).95  The rise of this group coincided with democratization in the favelas 
as well as the aftermath of Carlos Lacerda’s (military dictatorship, 1964–1978) attempt to 
repress armed political opposition.  The CV first emerged in the 1970s in the prison 
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system where members of armed political groups and common prisoners were housed 
together.  As previously mentioned, organizational learning and initial networking 
incubated in these circumstances.  This example illustrates the interaction between 
political prisoners and common prisoners and the effect of such interaction.   
Common criminals saw how the political prisoners organized themselves, 
sharing food or money that they received from outside the prison and 
enforcing strict discipline that banned inmates from attacking or stealing 
from each other, practices which were common in prison.  The political 
prisoners also joined together to defend any political prisoner who had 
been assaulted by guards or by other prisoners and to demand better 
conditions…The common prisoners organized themselves into a group 
initially called the Falange LSN.  This grouping called a coletivo or 
collective, was not a hierarchically structured organization.96  
This example illustrates the emergence of DTOs from pre-existing conditions in the 
1970s, namely the prison system of Brazil.  The development of these gangs into more 
organized facilitators of the drug trade is discussed in further detail.  
The CV has been attributed with creating working apparatus for drug trafficking 
in favela zones through zone control, coercion, and reciprocity with residents.  
Subsequent and rival groups such as the Pure Third Command and the Friends of Friends 
have carried out similar practices in facilitating the drug trade in the favelas.  The 
founding leadership mainly consisted of bank robbers and some drug dealers and during 
the 1980s, the CV entrenched themselves further in the drug trade.  A leadership group 
was set up via the prison system and these groups sought to establish themselves as the 
main retail sellers for Colombian cartels by controlling points of sale in Rio’s favelas.  
“By 1984, traffickers associated with the CV were well on their way to controlling the 
drug trade in Rio, as several important donos, or owners of drug selling points in favelas, 
were part of the organization or would soon join.”97   
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As a side observation (and one complimentary in nature), in 2005, President Lula 
of Brazil faced prison breakouts organized from inside prison walls.  “The prison rioting 
and breakouts, as well as coordinated attacks on police stations, buses, and other public 
buildings in Sao Paulo in 2005 and 2006, were perpetrated by Brazil’s best-organized 
criminal group—the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital)—which exerts control over 
140,000 in the Sao Paulo prison system.”98  This example illustrates the preeminence of 
the prison system and how over time, organized gangs have exerted a great amount of 
control and violence within the larger Brazilian social landscape.   
In short, the drug trade introduced another tool for leadership consolidation and 
resource accumulation for pre-existing gangs within Brazilian favelas. The burgeoning 
drug trade became a facet incorporated into pre-existing criminal networks, and these 
networks developed and flourished into DTOs.  Drug dealers were able to utilize the 
increased flow of money to buy weapons, bribe law enforcement, and provide services to 
favela residents; the drug trade therefore increased the resources available to DTOs 
within Brazil.  Moreover, not only did criminal networks flourish, but these DTOs 
integrated themselves and “high-jacked” favelas’ pre-existing social networks for their 
purposes.  Brazil’s favelas are non-conducive to production and cultivation of illicit 
drugs, however, geographical considerations coupled with the lack of state presence 
within these communities facilitates the drug trade from a retail perspective.  DTOs 
operate within the insular environment of favelas and focus on maintaining points of sale 
for illicit drugs.  Moreover, DTOs accomplish this task by controlling favela zones both 
territorially and in informal governance.  The next paragraphs illustrate similarities and 
differences between the emergence of DTOs in Colombia and Brazil. 
Brazil experiences some of the same pre-existing conditions as Colombia, mostly 
with regards to the geographical migration of the illicit drugs out of the Andean heartland 
across South America in the 1950s and 1960s.  Paul Gootenberg in “The Pre-Colombian 
Era of Drug Trafficking” (2007) traces out the migration of drug trafficking from Peru 
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and Bolivia to border posts in Brazil in the 1950s and 1960s.99  In Colombia, the drug 
trade migrated from Peru and Bolivia into the country during the same period and 
Colombia emerged as a drug production and distribution country.  In respect to 
geographical migration of illicit drugs, the emergence of drug trafficking is similar in 
both case studies.   
The first difference in how DTOs emerged in Colombia and Brazil takes into 
account the development of the drug trade and political considerations.  Since 1958, the 
state of Colombia has been unable to cope with forces of partisan struggle, globalization, 
drug traffickers, guerrilla movements, and paramilitary organizations.100  In the context 
of political development, the state never possessed the effective means to curtail the drug 
trade while coping with the other forces mentioned above.  Brazil’s 1964 authoritarian 
regime stifled the drug trade before the country could emerge as a major production or 
distribution conduit for illicit drugs.  However, Brazil failed to curtail the influx of illicit 
drugs into metropolitan centers and favela zones.  This difference highlights how the drug 
trade in Colombia was and is increasingly international while the drug trade in Brazil’s 
favelas is much more insular in nature. 
A second difference in how DTOs emerged in Colombia and Brazil takes into 
account actors within the drug trade.  DTOs in Colombia experienced interactions with 
insurgency groups and paramilitaries and changed from the major cartels of the 1970s to 
decentralized DTOs after the fall of major cartels in the 1990s.  Colombia’s mafias, 
cartels, insurgencies, and paramilitaries were focused on control of land because land 
served the dual purposes of drug production and strategic positioning (with regard to civil 
war for insurgencies and paramilitaries).   
In contrast, DTOs in Brazil’s favelas manifested from previously established 
criminal enterprise founded on contraband, petty rackets, and marijuana sales and these 
DTOs were largely shaped by the prison system whereupon organizational learning was 
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diffused.  Brazil’s criminal enterprise comprised not of the rural mafias, major drug 
cartels, insurgency groups, or paramilitaries found in Colombia; nor have Brazil’s DTOs 
focused on controlling land for drug production.  Brazil did not experience this dynamic 
within its favelas, these densely populated areas were more or less spoken for.  The issue 
for DTOs in Brazil became access (to points of sale) and control of pre-existing favela 
residencies.  The absence of this dynamic in comparison with Colombia can be attributed 
to the lack of civil war and associated actors such as insurgencies and paramilitaries.  In 
this respect, drug trafficking in Brazil’s favelas retains a much more urban and insular 
characteristic because Brazilian DTOs focus on favela zones and interactions with each 
other.  The next section illustrates how drug trafficking organizations operate as 
institutions within Brazilian favelas based structural composition, stability, behavioral 
control, and social cohesion.   Moreover, comparisons are made between Colombia and 
Brazil as informal institutions. 
B. BRAZILIAN DTOS AS INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
This section outlines how Brazilian DTOs qualify as informal institutions.  
Understanding how DTOs qualify as informal institutions enhances the understanding of 
these organizations on three levels: first how they emerged, second, how DTOs are 
characterized, and finally how DTOs sustain themselves as viable institutional entities.  
Morover, DTOs undergo the process of institutionalization through entrenchment and 
development of the institutional  characteristics these organizations display.  These 
characteristics as previously indicated are structural composition, stability, behavioral 
control, and social cohesion and are expounded upon in subsequent sections.  
Furthermore, comparisons are drawn between the case studies to expand understanding of 
how the DTOs operate and are characterized. 
1. Structurally Connected to Society 
Research and analysis illustrates drug trafficking organizations operating in ways 
that qualify them as informal institutions.  First, DTOs are a structural feature of 
Brazilian society.   In Rio’s favelas, studies have shown that residents deal with security 
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by relying on drug traffickers to resolve many neighborly disputes and enforce local 
norms.  As one favela resident put it, “we live in a state within a state…the law that 
operates is the law without law.  That is the law of the other side, that of the traffickers.  
If people have a problem they go to them.”101  Organizations like the CV, in the 1980s 
practiced “neighborliness.”  Drawing from founding rules within the prison system, such 
as the prohibition of attacking, robbing, or raping one another, trafficers associated with 
the CV instituted these practices in providing security and reciprocity within favela 
communities.  In exchange for the prohibition of crime and relative security, residents 
would comply and protect CV members from the authorities.  This system of mutual 
assistance allowed traffickers to leverage themselves within favela networks (citizens and 
associated participants) and further entrench themselves in the drug trade.102  
In the favelas, the state has historically failed in providing adequate services and 
security.  In addition, police are often looked at with suspicion, and residents are 
marginalized from the judicial system.  Perceptions among favela residents offer limited 
options in daily life.  Consequently, these traffickers and gangs “provide an alternative 
justice system, a parallel state if you will, among the poorest, who thoroughly reject a 
corrupt police force and, in their everyday lives, seek some organized entity that can 
administer justice in the local arena.”103 
Moreover, as drug traffickers are put behind bars, more people will take their 
place.  While there is a lack of concrete numbers of those involved in drug trafficking, an 
estimation model of DTO recruitment resembles a fluctuating revolving door with new 
members continuously pouring in.  Specifically, incoming DTO recruits are mainly 
youths (ages twelve to seventeen) from the Brazilian favelas.  In 2008, a sampling of 325 
incarcerated youth (ages twelve to seventeen) in Brazil showed that 44 percent of males 
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and 53 percent of females had been involved in the drug trade in some way.  The criteria 
for being involved in the drug trade comprised of either selling drugs, carrying drugs for 
other than personal use, having others sell drugs for them or working as a lookout for a 
drug dealer.  From a sociological perspective, there were a myriad of factors attributed to 
youth involvement in drug trafficking, ranging from witnessing violence, gun access, lack 
of education, and socioeconomic status of the family.  The study did not extract exclusive 
independent variables, but pointed to these factors as being mutually attributive in the 
drug trade among youth.104  The convergence of these factors, favela residents 
interactions with drug runners, organizational entrenchment (i.e., CV, donos in favelas), 
and rising youth involvement in the drug trade illustrates an important institutional 
characteristic.  In the case of Brazilian favelas, DTOs are not marginal actors or sporadic 
entities, but remain a structural societal feature that has proliferated over time.  Brazilian 
DTOs have been described as structural features of society; the next paragraph illustrates 
Brazilian DTOs as stable institutions.  Moreover, differences and similarities to the 
Colombian case study are highlighted. 
2. Stability 
Stability is also an institutional characteristic that drug trafficking organizations 
have displayed over time.  Stability sets institutions apart from cyclical phenomenon or 
trends; in the Brazilian case, DTOs have remained a fixture on the country’s historical 
landscape since the 1970s.  In the case of Brazilian favelas, “drug trafficking emerged as 
a powerful force in Rio in the mid-1980s, as the country underwent a transition to 
democracy.”105  This chapter asserts that the DTOs within favelas have been the vehicle 
for drug trafficking since the later 1970s.  Most notably, DTOs found early roots in the 
1970s, proliferated and consolidated power in 1980s, and during the 1990s innovated the 
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trade while further entrenching themselves in Brazil’s favelas.  Since the 1980s, DTOs 
operated in favelas and sought territorial control over them. 
The 1987 Santa Marta war – a weeklong struggle between rival 
organizations for control of the South Zone favela and its access to the 
expanding middle-class market brought these patterns to the attention of 
most for the first time.  Television and journalistic coverage of the conflict 
made it clear that drug trafficking in the favela was no longer a 
homegrown phenomenon dedicated primarily to the distribution of 
marijuana within the neighborhood, but now involved well-connected, 
heavily-armed gangsters violently taking over key territory in order to sell 
cocaine.106  
This chapter has not delved into political and law enforcement corruption.  
However, one mark of stability as an institutional parameter requires “buy-in” from a 
myriad of participants to ensure longevity.  Brazilian favelas incorporate many actors, 
and DTOs act as the conduit for drug proliferation.  The involvement of corrupt police 
marks a system of collusion, checks, and balances among participants, as this 1993 
example shows. 
The notorious 1993 massacre in the North Zone favela of Vigario Geral 
subsequently made it clear to all observers, if there had been any 
remaining doubt, the position of the military police in the rise of the drug 
trade.  Off-duty policemen slaughtered twenty-one residents of the favela 
in an act of vengeance after being cut out of their regular payment by the 
local gang leader.107  
Similarly, scholars have increasing pointed to the connections among drug 
traffickers and politicians.  In the period following Brazil’s military regime, the 
government continued to use corruption and clientelism as control mechanisms over 
politicians, in turn stifling reform in judicial and law enforcement practices.  DTO 
networks emerged in this climate with relationships between organized crime and 
corruption flourishing.  Three types of relationships have been analyzed.108  First, there 
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are sporadic contacts between organized crime and politicians to secure illegal activities.  
Second, there are symbiotic relationships based upon periodic contacts between 
organized crime and politicians to secure illegal activities.   Finally, there is the 
implantation relationship, where criminal organizations operate openly in the legal world.  
In the implantation relationship, DTOs establish direct links to political parties and 
politicians.  Case in point, the earlier 1993 massacre example, in the aftermath, the 
victorious faction (over control of Vigario Geral favela) nominated a candidate in the 
1988 election of Association officers and won handily.109  Moreover, these ties are more 
articulated as symbiotic relationships between DTOs, civic leaders, politicians, residency 
associations, the police, and residents within the favelas.  The exact power positioning 
fluctuates among these actors at various times.  However, DTOs monopolize the 
apparatus of violence, control physical territory, and maintain closer relationships with 
the community and thus are the conduit for most decisions made within these 
communities.  Hence, as drug trafficking evolved in Rio, DTOs emerged as a “new type 
of political actor that is part of a wider privatization of violence whose political position 
in poor communities stems from an appropriation of state power.”110  
Historical analysis of DTOs in Brazil’s favelas does not end with the 1990s or 
2000s, the drug trade is still a stable feature and we observe that drug wars still rage in 
Rio today.111  Stability as an institutional parameter of Brazilian DTOs is observed 
through the convergence of both time in operation (and existence) and established 
relationships with numerous actors, thus ensuring DTO viability.  These observations 
illustrate DTOs within Brazil over time, and points to the stability of these organizations 
as institutions. Brazilian DTOs have been described with regard to stability.  The next 
paragraph illustrates differences and similarities with regards to stability in Colombia. 
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Since the introduction of illicit drugs in both regions, drug trafficking has been 
stable; this stability has been observed despite differing contexts and changes in both 
countries.  In this respect, the institutional parameter of stability shows little 
differentiation in the case studies.  However, it is important to note that DTOs in both 
countries have achieved stability by differing means.  By means, the section refers to how 
DTOs in both cases incorporate actors and tactics that are distinct to their respective 
contexts.  For example, Colombian DTOs have evolved to deal directly with sweeping 
state-led counter-drug approaches (for example, Plan Colombia) and have had to oversee 
trafficking from cultivation, to production, and distribution while incorporating 
insurgency and paramilitary dynamics.  Brazilian DTOs have not necessarily needed to 
deal with large or encompassing state-led approaches.  Brazilian DTOs within the favelas 
are different by having to adapt to more local and insular incursions by the police, and on 
a few occasions federal forces.  Moreover, Brazilian DTOs within the favelas focus more 
on access and points of sale within their zones and are not required to oversee cultivation 
or production aspects of the drug trade.  These contextual differences are important to 
note in viewing operations within the case studies.  However, as stated earlier, in the case 
of stability as an institutional parameter, there is little differentiation between DTOs in 
Colombia and Brazil.  The stability of Brazilian DTOs has been discussed; the next 
paragraph illustrates Brazilian DTOs and the use of behavioral control.  Moreover, 
differences and similarities in the Colombian case study are highlighted. 
3. Internally Disciplined 
Another institutional characteristic is behavioral control; behavioral control is 
described as placing expectations and rules on members within an institution.112  DTOs 
impose limits on their members and affect individual behavior through retribution and 
accountability.  Structurally speaking, the drug trade in Rio’s favelas are organized with 
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participants understanding certain rules and norms.  The drug trade is controlled by a 
dono (owner) who usually appoints a general manager to run day to day operations.  
Depending on the structure, submanagerial positions such as security chiefs and 
accountants are employed.  In upper level dealings, those outside particular factions may 
purchase drugs from  wholesalers, who are thought to be more powerful through 
international distribution connections.  Within this type of structuring, the roles of each 
participant is understood and enforced.  For example, faction members are not allowed to 
attack certain members, retailers, or distributors.  Factions may not travel to certain areas 
controlled by rivals; moreover, if they attack another faction, they face the possibility of 
reprisal through faction alliances.  Faction members are allowed to switch affiliation 
depending on certain circumstances and personal relationships.  When it comes to faction 
structuring, the drug trade above the favela in Rio is loosely organized into four factions, 
and real power projection of these factions lies in the prison system.  Within the system, a 
dono (owner)113 who “violates certain rules, such as disclosing information about the 
faction to the press, may have to provide some sort of accounting to the faction 
leadership.”114  
An example is derived from the CV, an organization with known drug trafficking 
ties in the favelas.  Within the CV, rules such as killing, stealing, raping, and informing 
were prohibited.  These rule and norms were first codified within the prison system and 
eventually transferred to drug trafficking in the favelas.115  There are numerous informal 
rules, practices, and norms that influence the behavior of DTO members and those 
associated with the drug trade in the favelas.  These inherent understandings and 
constraints constitute behavioral control on members of Brazilian DTOs, and thus,  
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emerges as an institutional parameter.  Brazilian DTOs have been described with regard 
to behavioral control; the next paragraph illustrates differences and similarities to the 
Colombian case study.  
DTOs in both case studies exercise a certain amount of behavioral control on its 
members.  Simply put, the nature of drug trafficking as a criminal enterprise requires 
behavioral control to ensure the survivability of these organizations and its members.  
Regarding behavioral control as an institutional parameter, the case studies offer little 
differentiation.  Because of the illicit nature of DTOs, there are no codified or 
documented rules and norms for members to abide by.  In both case studies, there exists 
an implied understanding of rules and expectations that forms the basis of action and 
conduct.  Furthermore, these rules and expectations are enforced through retribution and 
violence, the key aspect is survivability engendered among DTO members.  
While behavioral control as an institutional characteristic is similar in both case 
studies, it is important to remember that drug trafficking entails different actors across 
both case studies, thus the exact forms of behavioral control may vary.  In the Colombian 
case, there are multiple levels of horizontal and verticle accountability, especially when 
looking at decentralized cells of operations that emerged subsequent to the fall of major 
cartels.  Furthermore, insurgency groups and paramilitaries have their own set of rules 
and norms that are both similar and different to DTOS in Colombia.  Insurgency groups 
and paramilitaries have their own set of rules as it pertains to prosecuting civil war.   
In contrast, DTOs within Brazil’s favelas incoporate actors from donos (owners), 
to submanagerial positions, to groups116 associated with drug trafficking such as the 
Comando Vermelho (Red Command), Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends), and 
Terceiro Comando Puro (Pure Third Command).  All these groups have their own set of 
rule and norms that informally codify conduct for their members.  Looking holistically at 
DTOs in both case studies, the fear of capture, prosecution, death, or extradiction bounds 
all members of DTOs in following rules, norms, and expectations for members of the 
informal institution.  There is no major divergence with regards to behavioral control in 
                                                 
116 The CV, ADA, and TCP are all rival gangs within Brazil’s favelas and have known ties with illicit 
drugs trafficking.  
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both case studies, the essential similarity lies in behavioral control as a parameter of 
informal institutionalization.  Brazilian DTOs have been described in the purview of 
behavioral control; the next paragraph illustrates Brazilian DTOs and social cohesion.  
Moreover, differences and similarities to the Colombian case study are highlighted. 
4. Internally Cohesive   
Lastly, a shared sense of values among members identifies an institution and 
gives it internal cohesion. A shared sense of values also strengthens the institution.  Drug 
trafficking organizations share ideals, beliefs, and values which may culminate in a 
common social identity.  The recruitment of individuals into DTOs may be predicated on 
the need for power, belonging, respect, security and pride. Moreover, scholars have 
assessed similarities between organized crime in Brazilian favelas and the “Mafia” 
generally.  Most notably, the similarities comprise the culture of violence, conspicuous 
consumption, and exploitation of the weak.117  Other scholars point out a type of familial 
brotherhood and sense of organizational belonging among members in these 
organizations, as noted through various interviews.118  It is difficult to quantify 
empirically a shared sense of values or cultural underpinnings of DTOs in Brazil.  
However, there is evidence to support the notion that members within DTOs operate 
under a “loose” set of ideals and beliefs that solidify them as institutions. 
Take for example the CV, during the 1970s, the CV “developed a distinct 
organizational structure and set of symbols, discourses, and tactics used to legitimize 
itself in Rio’s favelas.”  The group utilized rhetoric espousing defending favelas against 
attack by outsiders, and standing up against corrupt and abusive authority.  The policy of 
neighborliness (respecting favela residents, mutual assistance) underpinned how the CV 
created a type of “narco-culture” that defined the organization and its members.  For 
some members, residing in a particular neighborhood associated with a particular 
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commando is an important part of their social identity.  Graffiti, clothing, and other 
symbol sets articulated this sense of belonging among trafficking members.119  
Perhaps the best illustration of cultural belonging and shared sense of ideals and 
beliefs lies in Brazilian proibidao funk (prohibited rap music).120  This type of music 
covers a broad range of themes, to include violence, sexuality, and even religion.  
Musically, it incorporates facets of electronic beats, sound effects, samples, techno and 
hip-hop.  Moreover, since the late 1980s, this type of music has been especially popular 
with youth in the favelas.  Gangs and criminal factions have increasingly used and 
sponsored outdoor street dances known as bailes de comunidade (community dances) to 
represent and showcase their power.  These dances provide a tool for DTOs within the 
favelas on two fronts.  For one, the dances glorify the gangsters through the projection of 
coded overtones.  Often these songs contain images and codes that reinforce the support 
of governance by and power of criminals within the community.  Such images act to 
legitimize the DTOs role within the community.  Second, by sponsoring these dances, the 
community sees these gangsters as providing a social service, which reinforces 
clientelistic ties already apparent.  These venues also provide a backdrop for criminals to 
further connect with the community and entrench them within the social network.121   
This chapter also alluded to the recruitment of youth into drug trafficking 
organizations.  In Rio, “children become involved in the drug trade as young as ten or 
eleven, although most street-level dealers appear to be in their late teens.”122  A common 
social and prevailing identity among younger drug dealers in Rio may be centered around 
the common conditions of exclusion, violence, and discrimination while growing up on 
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the streets of Rio.123  The presence of street children reached a noticeable level in the 
1960s.  “The continuing urban inflow of low-skilled labor, along with makeshift 
settlements, increased the number of poor children perceived to be a problem, as well as 
the level of social desperation.”124  These prevailing conditions among favelas youth 
greatly increase recruitment possibilities into DTOs.  These same originating bonds are 
transferred and reinforced once members identify themselves with DTOs in the favelas.   
The convergence of these factors, the prevailing socioeconomic background of 
drug runners and recruits, the use of symbols by drug trafficking organizations, and the 
forum of community dances synthesizes a shared sense of values among DTO members.  
This shared sense of ideals, beliefs, and values underpin social cohesion as an 
institutional parameter of Brazilian DTOs.  Brazilian DTOs have been described with 
regard to social cohesion; the next paragraphs illustrate differences and similarities to the 
Colombian case study. 
DTOs in both cases share ideals, beliefs, and values, and the combination of these 
aspects have cultivated a common social identity.  From a comparative perspective, 
DTOs in both case studies are similar in social cohesion.  One observation is that the 
recruitment of individuals into DTOs is predicated on the need for power, belonging, 
respect, security and pride.125  In the Colombian case study, the social base for drug 
traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitaries derive from commonality.  These groups draw 
from “localities with the same kind of socioeconomic profile.”126  Also, the youths who 
become increasingly involved in the drug trade in Brazil, are drawn from the same 
socioeconomic profile as in Colombia.   
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The point of departure and difference is encountered when one looks at the social 
and political context that social cohesion formed in the case studies.  In Colombia, a half 
century of political violence than encompassed partisan violence, mafia violence, 
insurgency violence and drug-related violence shaped the social context of Colombian 
DTO members.  While Brazilian citizens and DTO members have also experienced 
periods of violence, this violence did not form the social context of half a century.  
Moreover, violence in the last half century of Brazil’s history was not violence associated 
with insurgencies or paramilitaries.  The scope and character of life in Brazil’s favelas is 
not a composition of historic civil war as it is in Colombia.  The next section summarizes 
findings and observations from the chapter.   
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed DTOs within Brazilian favelas and looked at two facets in 
particular.  First, when and how did DTOs become rooted in Brazilian favelas?  Research 
points out that the burgeoning drug trade (and networks) of the 1980s linked up with pre-
existing criminal networks and loosely organized gangs in Brazil.  Illicit drugs migrated 
out of the Andes and across South America and entered into Brazil in much the same 
manner as Colombia.   However, political conditions shaped the rising drug trade insofar 
as Brazil becoming a major conduit for illicit drugs, while Colombia became a major 
exporter of cocaine in particular.  Conditions in Brazil however, failed to stifle the 
entrance of illicit drugs into favela zones, which lacked and still lack a significant state 
presence.  Due to these factors, drug trafficking in Brazil is much more insular in nature 
because DTOs focus on controlling points of sale within these zones.  Second, this 
chapter illustrated how Brazilian DTOs meet the criteria for being institutions based on 
structural composition, stability, behavioral control, and social cohesion.  Important 
similarities and differences among institutional characteristics were outlined; these 
illustrated how DTOs in the cases studies are unique with regards to how they emerged 
and may be characterized.   
Furthermore, the preceding chapters highlighted stability (or longevity) as one 
characteristic of DTOs as informal institutions.   The next chapter illustrates the factors 
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that contribute to the sustainment of DTOs in the case studies of Colombia and Brazil.  
By understanding what sustains DTOs as informal institutions, one gains an important 












IV. DTOS: WHAT SUSTAINS THEM? 
The preceding chapters alluded to stability (or longevity) as an institutional 
characteristic; this chapter aims to explain what contributes to the sustainability of DTOs 
in the Colombian and Brazilian case studies.  The essential takeaway is to understand 
what holistically sustains DTOs in their respective and distinct contexts.  Colombia is 
shaped by internal conflict and its role as a producer country.  Therefore, the drug 
dynamic in Colombia places emphasis on control of land for drug production.  Brazil on 
the other hand does not experience internal conflict and is not a producer country.  
Therefore, the drug dynamic in Brazil places emphasis on controlling internal dynamics 
of favela zones.  These factors shape how sustainability manifests differently in the case 
studies.  This chapter will also outline the similarities and differences between the DTOs 
with respect to what sustains them.  The sustainability aspect of DTOs offers insight by 
examining factors that enable DTOs to proliferate in spite of numerous counter-drug 
efforts.  By understanding the factors that can be attributed to the longevity of DTOs and 
their operations, pragmatic and comprehensive approaches can be formulated for specific 
contexts.  In turn, these pragmatic and comprehensive approaches can curtail 
proliferation of the illicit drug trade in these specific case studies, and may provide a 
model for the future analysis in other countries. 
In looking at sustainability factors, DTOs in both cases have proven to be organic, 
evolving entities.  Sustainability in the Colombian case study is attributed to competitive 
adaptation in the face of specific counter-drug efforts.  Competitive adaptation is shaped 
by civil war and Colombia’s status as a producer country.  In Brazil, sustainability is 
attributed to informal networks; the use of such networks is fueled by the insular nature 
of Brazil’s drug trade.  One must recognize that these sustainability factors are not 
mutually exclusive.  Much deeper analysis may undoubtedly uncover DTOs in Colombia 
utilizing informal networks and DTOs in Brazil utilizing competitive adaptation.  The 
next section offers more detail on how competitive adaptation emerges in the Colombian 
case study.    
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A. COLOMBIA  
DTOs in Colombia entrench and empower themselves via competitive adaptation 
in the face of specific counter-drug efforts.  To reiterate, competitive adaptation refers to 
how traffickers learn and change practices to outmaneuver police and state counter-drug 
efforts.  Michaeal Kenney thoroughly details competitive adaptation in his book, From 
Pablo to Osama (2007).  As outlined in earlier chapters, Colombia’s civil war has 
introduced a myriad of armed actors.   Whle these actors engaged in drug trafficking, 
subsequent pressure from the state prompted competitive adaptation to ensure 
survivability of DTOs and the drug trade.  Moreover, Colombia’s status as a drug 
producting country prompted constant innovation for delivering illicit products to the 
international market. Subequent paragraphs expound on competetive adaptation.  
However, before delving into competitive adaptation, it is important to briefly illustrate 
the context that Colombian DTOs and law enforcement operate in.  If traffickers are able 
to  competitively adapt, then one might ask how law enforcement may be able to 
comptetitively adapt as well; this assertion would nullify competitive adaption as a 
sustainability factor in the case study.   
Competetive adaption does not apply to agencies of the state, such as law 
enforcement.  From a contextual point of view, law enforcement agencies are at an 
inherent disadvantage because of their heirarchical bureaucratic structure. 127   They face 
multiple decision-making layers, multiple authorities, and administrative oversight.  
Moreover, law enforcement agencies face complex operational enviroments, inter-agency 
cooperation challenges, and multiple jurisdictions in prosecuting the war on drugs.  
Furthermore, these agencies are bound by legal and bureaucratic limitations in protecting 
individual rights and liberties.  Colombian DTOs by contrast do not face these 
challenges, they are characterized as fluid, flatter (organizationally), and not bound by the 
same constraints.  They operate outside conventional rule of law and adapt quicker than 
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their law enforcemment counterparts because organizational survival depends on it.  
Trafficking networks are adaptive because they change their practices in response to 
counter-drug operations.  For example, Colombian DTOs respond to law enforcement 
raids by moving shipment routes and processing labs and develop new ways to hide illicit 
commodities.  Another example is as simple as drug runners changing phone numbers, 
safe houses, and other traceable footprints that can lead to their capture.  Summarily put, 
DTOs in Colombia adapt through organizational structuring, information gathering and 
interpretation, and process adaptation, these processes include production, transportation, 
and distribution.   
The many facets of competitive adaptation include compartmentalized 
structuring, the gathering and interpreting of information dynamically, and implementing 
lessons learned adaptively.  First and foremost, Colombian DTOs have structured 
themselves into compartamentalized cells that operate without a centralized command.128  
Colombian DTOs form two basic types of networks, these are known as wheel and chain 
networks.  Wheel networks  are managed by a core group with associated nodes that 
perform specific tasks.  These core groups contract services to nodes.  These services 
may include transportation, distribution, equipment, intelligence and money laundering.  
These core groups are often headed by veteran traffickers with the knowledge and 
contacts to coordinate drug shipments.  Chain networks by contrast operate without core 
groups and remain largely horizontal in nature.  A chain network is decentralized and 
contract services without mediation from core groups.  Furthermore, transactions are 
characterized as small, incremental movements as opposed to larger trans-national 
shipments.  Both types of networks protect themselves from penetration by law 
enforcement through compartamentalizing their operations.  An example is derived from 
an interview with a former maritime smuggler in a transportation cell, “Freddy” said, 
“they don’t need to know nothing about nothing, just what they need to produce.”  The 
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reason was explained as “if you cross over the jobs, then people will know each 
other.”129  The utilization of compartmentalized cells illustrates adaptation by DTOs in 
the wake of U.S. and Colombian tactical success against larger cartel organizations in the 
1990s.   
Second, Colombian DTOs gather and interpret information dynamically; this 
allows them to adapt more readily to counter-drug operations.130  Specifically, 
Colombia’s role in production and cultivation requires increasingly innovative methods 
for shipping illicit drugs out of the country.  Air dropping narcotics is standard practice in 
the drug trade; however, the specific technique of air-dropping narcotics became to be 
refined over time.  An example comes from a drug smuggling ring led by Max 
Mermelstein, who ran a Colombian cell for distribution and transportation during the 
1980s.  It was in 1981 when U.S. law enforcement intercepted a plane carrying over $12 
million worth of cocaine.  On that day, the pilot was forced to jettison the product into the 
Gulf of Mexico in an effort to avoid prosecution.  Following the bust, Mermelstein and 
his crew turned the failure into innovation by utilizing air-dropping as a method of 
transportation after experimentation and trial runs in Colombia.  Moreover, some drug 
runners improved on the process by utilizing radio transmitters and global positioning 
devices to pick up the dropped narcotics.  Utilizing practice runs and props, 
“Mermelstein’s ring communicated the technical and experimental knowledge embedded 
in their routine to other nodes in the inter-organizational network,” and thus prompted a 
new transportation practice which is still in use today.131     
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Finally, while processing information dynamically is critical for implementing 
lessons learned to current operations truly codifies competitive adaptation.132  
Colombia’s role as a production country has prompted a trans-shipment arms race for 
getting illicit products out of the country to distribution centers or nodes.  Since the late 
1970s, drug-smuggling routes have changed in response to state interdiction efforts.  As 
one route began to draw “heat” (attention), DTOs shifted their routes accordingly.  When 
federal authorities brought pressure to cocaine smuggling in South Florida in the early 
1980s, traffickers adjusted by shifted their routes easterly to places like Alabama and 
Texas.  Besides shifting routes, traffickers also implemented a variety of air, sea, and land 
methods of shipment.  If law enforcement conentrated on smaller planes, then DTOs 
employed larger craft.  When law enforcement grasped sky transit, then maritime 
transportation evolved from standard boats to go-fast vessels to the now increasingly 
utilized semi-submerssibles.  Colombian DTOs also adapted by hiding illicit product 
within legitimate products in large cargo container shipments, and in some cases DTOs 
procured legitimate businesses to facilitate these shipments. 
Strategic failures on the part of U.S. and Colombian counter-drug policy have 
(inconsequently) strengthened the drug trade and DTOs and has prompted DTOs to 
competitively adapt to survive..  Specifically, one observes that the U.S.–Colombian 
strategy has focused more on specific actors and supply side eradication (via aerial 
fumigation) as opposed to holistic counter-drug measures.  Peceny and Durnan in, “The 
FARC’s Best Friend” highlight three key trends to note.133  First, the more intently U.S. 
policy focuses on particular source countries, the more likely that production of illicit 
drugs will shift to other countries, this observation most aptly correlates to the balloon 
effect.  Second, the more intently U.S. policy focuses on particular source countries, the 
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more difficult it is for governments of source countries to forge informal public-private 
partnerships to control the illicit drug trade.  Therefore, it is more likely that informal, 
armed actors will benefit from drug derived profits.  Third, the more intently U.S. policy 
focuses on particular actors (i.e., DTOs) in particular source countries, the more likely 
that production of illicit drugs will shift to other countries, the more likely it is that other 
actors will profit from the drug trade.   
The primacy of strategic failure on the part of U.S.–Colombian counter-drug 
policy falls on the third trend noted by Peceny and Durnan.  The U.S.–Colombian 
counter-drug effort, which brought down prominent cartels in the 1990s, benefited 
insurgency groups like the FARC and ELN.  As counter-drug policy shifted toward 
counterinsurgency and actors such as the FARC and ELN, profits from the drug trade in 
turn shifted toward other actors such as the paramilitaries.  Efforts to demobilize 
paramilitaries by the Colombian government have in turn led to the creation and rise of 
new paramilitary groups that are increasingly involved in the drug trade.  From a strategic 
standpoint, while the United States and Colombia focused on specific actors, the drug 
trade as facilitated by DTOs shifted accordingly.134  This shift in drug trade dynamics 
characterizes adaptation by DTOs and illustrates the flawed U.S.–Colombian approach in 
counter-drug policy.   
Specifically, how did the United States and Colombia come to focus on actors in a 
piecemeal fashion?  Simply put, internal conflict and civil war led the United States and 
Colombia to focus (primarily) on one set of actors at a time.  Chapter II highlighted the 
emergence of Colombian DTOs in the 1970s; these prominent cartels consolidated power 
and increased their political power through legal and illegal means.  Furthermore, as 
DTOs engaged in political kidnappings and killings, the Colombian government became 
increasingly threatened as the legitimate sovereign of the state.  Subsequently, Colombian 
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counter-drug mobilization, coupled with U.S. pressure and aid (financial, personnel, 
intelligence, equipment, and logistics) eventually brought down prominent cartels.  The 
breakup of the two largest Colombian cartels in the 1990s (Medellin and Cali) did not 
spell the end of the drug trade however.  Two important consequences are observed from 
the dismantling of these cartels.  First, smaller, decentralized organizations filled in the 
vacuum left behind by larger cartels.  Second, the dismantling of the cartels (specifically, 
the Cali cartel) removed a powerful opponent of armed insurgents such as the FARC.  
The removal of the cartels removed a large base of logistical and financial support for 
paramilitary groups which had forged alliances with cartels in combating insurgency 
groups.  Under these conditions, the FARC was able to reestablish control of many rural 
zones previously held by the cartels and paramilitaries.  It is also important to note that 
previous counter-narcotic efforts focused on drug cartels, which in turn enabled the 
FARC to grow in numbers, land, and weaponry.135   Furthermore, counter-drug efforts in 
Peru and Bolivia shifted drug production increasingly to Colombia.  The shifting of the 
drug industry in the 1990s into FARC controlled zones enabled the FARC to tax and gain 
profit from the drug trade.  The resulting conditions did not stave off drug production, by 
“1997, Colombia became the largest producer of coca in the Andean region.”136   
The U.S. government has framed Colombia’s internal conflict around the issue of 
drug control as a means of gaining support and palatability for Plan Colombia, an 
approach that has failed. 137  The essential strategic failure within the plan was increased 
emphasis on counterinsurgency over time, as well as not recognizing paramilitaries as 
part of the drug control equation.  The initial launching of Plan Colombia had a primary 
counter-drug focus with counterinsurgency as the secondary priority.  Subsequent to the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the world trade center, U.S. policy increasingly 
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focused on armed non-state actors, such as the FARC, while counter-narcotics became 
secondary tasking.  Examples of the shift in policy include: 1) expanded missions and 
units, 2) inception of the pipeline protection program in 2002,138 and, 3) proposed 
increased troop levels for U.S. military personnel.  The shift in policy undercut specific 
counter-drug efforts and diverted resources from counter-drug programs to counter-
insurgency programs.  Moreover, when Colombian President Alvaro Uribe took office in 
2002, Colombian policy shifted toward a harder line stance with insurgencies, citing 
counterterrorism logic.  Opponents of Plan Colombia cited how paramilitary involvement 
in the drug trade was not adequately addressed.   
Because the U.S.–Colombian approach since 2002 had been focused on 
insurgency groups while failing to curtail paramilitary organizations, paramilitary groups 
benefitted and expanded their control of resources and land. 139  “Thus, the U.S. decision 
to focus its antidrug efforts on funding a counterinsurgency campaign to defeat the FARC 
has helped generate a powerful new player in the cocaine industry.”140  The United Self-
Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) were forged in the mid-1990s in part from 
paramilitaries that previously worked for prominent cartels.  The Colombian government 
and military forged relationships with the AUC, with a specific focus on combating 
insurgency groups.  The sanctioning and support of the AUC subsequently allowed the 
paramilitaries to benefit from the drug trade.  It also became clear that much of the 
violence perpetuated in Colombia in this period was, in fact committed by paramility 
groups: they were on balance responsible for the majority of human rights abuses in their 
period of ascendancy.  The Council on Hemispheric affairs cites that paramilitary groups 
“averaged 300 or so human rights violations a year from 1993 to 1995 (out of 
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approximately 500 civilian victims annually).”141  Furthermore, “by 1999, over 75 
percent of extrajudicial killings were being committed by paramilitary groups.”142  
Undercutting the counterinsurgency focus of Plan Colombia has been a strategic failure 
in counter-drug policy, “at the end of 2003 Colombia was still the leading producer of 
cocaine in the Western Hemisphere, and the internal armed conflict was still raging.”143  
Moreover, as referenced in Chapter II, between 2003 and 2006, Colombia implemented a 
massive paramilitary demobilization process and the government claimed the successful 
demobilization of 30,000 personnel.  However, since then, new groups may have 
emerged, and have taken over criminal operations previously run by the AUC.144  
Violence and human rights abuses are still committed by the new paramilitaries.  “In 
2007, after four years of demobilization, the paramilitaries committed 500 human rights 
abuses, more than at any time prior to 1996.”145  Concurrently, as the U.S. and 
Colombian governments have focused on specific actors, drug operations have shifted 
accordingly.  All the while, decentralized DTOs and other groups have facilitated the 
drug trade despite comprehensive counter-drug efforts.  The preceding paragraphs 
illustrated how the civil war in Colombia shaped a piecemeal U.S.–Colombian approach 
toward armed actors.  This approach inconsequently facilitated competitive adaptation on 
the part of DTOs as drug dynamics shifted according to concerted efforts of the state.   
As noted, sustainability via competitive adaptation has also been shaped by 
Colombia’s role as a drug producing country.  Because of Colombia’s role, supply-side 
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initiatives have more or less dominated counter-drug policy in the country. Within the 
purview of Plan Colombia, eradication in the form of aerial fumigation was a cornerstone 
for ridding illicit drugs in the country.  However, while aerial fumigation has had 
moderate success, the approach has most aptly failed.  Ramirez Lemus et al, in Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America highlighted two trends to note: 1) sharp reductions in illicit 
crops in 2002–2003 did not bring cultivation down to 1998 levels, and 2) eradication in 
one area has give rise to cultivation in other areas.  The book also cites other shortfalls in 
aerial fumigation such as high costs, health and environmental risks, and collateral 
damage.146   
Besides these shortfalls, aerial fumigation has the unintended consequence of 
strengthening DTOs through eradication’s effects on illicit crop farmers.  The lack of aid 
and crop alternatives have driven poor farmers to cultivate illicit crops, which in turn 
helps DTOs and stifle government eradication efforts.147  Peceny and Durnan, in “The 
FARC’s Best Friend,” highlighted that fumigation is seen by farmers as an attack on their 
livelihood.  This perception has contributed to civilian support of actors involved in the 
drug trade.148  Furthermore, recent studies have shown that Colombia’s eradication 
policy falls short in providing viable alternatives in coca-afflicted areas and that more 
assistance is needed for farmers to switch to licit crops.149  Colombia is a producer 
country with pockets of land in and out of the control of various actors.  These actors 
(and DTOs) have adjusted and capitalized on the failures of aerial fumigation.  Utilizing 
competitive adaptation, DTOs have mitigated the intended consequences of eradication 
by shifting cultivation patterns, while also strengthening themselves via the unintended  
 
                                                 
146 Maria Clemencia Ramirez Lemus et.al., “Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War,” In 
Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2005), 112–122.  
147 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Colombia: The Narco Wars,” In Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the 
War on Drugs, by Vanda Felbab-Brown (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2010), 103.  
148  Mark Peceny and Michael Durnan, “The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the 
Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s,” Latin American Politics and Society 48:2 (2006): 109. 
149 Vanda Felbab-Brown, et al., Assessment of the Implementation of the United States Government's 
Support for Plan Colomiba's Illicit Crop Reduction Components, United States Agency of International 
Development (USAID), Washington, DC: Management Systems International (2009): 48.  
 69
consequences of the state.  DTOs in Colombia sustain themselves via competitive 
adaptation.  The nature of this adaptation is shaped by Colombia’s ongoing civil war and 
role as a drug production country.        
B. BRAZIL 
For the case of Brazil, sustainability can be explained by the fact that DTOs 
entrench and empower themselves as legitimate actors through informal social networks.  
The primacy of networks is fueled by two factors that shape drug dynamics within 
Brazil’s favelas.  First, Brazil lacks the civil war that is experienced in Colombia, thus 
DTOs in Brazil do not incorporate as many actors or shift dynamically.  Second, as stated 
earlier, the drug trade in Brazil is much more focused on internal distribution and retail.  
The convergence of these factors places primacy on networks within Brazil’s favelas.  
Subsequent paragraphs shed light on the role of networks for Brazil’s drug trade. 
Networks play an important role in social and democratic movements by 
mobilizing large groups of people that might not otherwise do so.150  However, networks 
can also be leveraged for illegal purposes.  Research indicates that DTOs entrench and 
empower themselves as legitimate actors through social networks.  “Because of the 
pattern in which low-income areas in Latin American cities (like favelas) were settled, as 
well as the prominent role of the informal sector in local economies, disadvantaged 
neighborhoods in these cities are often characterized as having dense social networks.”151  
When looking at network theory, legitimacy is often placed on formal actors such as non-
governmental organizations, unions, or interest groups, because these groups operate in 
formal channels.  However, legitimacy within specific social and political contexts varies 
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(residency associations, politicians, law enforcement, and drug traffickers), and research 
points to a burgeoning clientelism which places legitimacy on drug trafficking 
organizations.152   
Networks provide a basis for DTOs in Brazil to operate.  Networks are horizontal, 
informal organizations that connect actors with similar interests.153  Networks help 
member groups accomplish objectives under varied circumstances by promoting 
specialization among members.  Furthermore, networks allow members who want to 
change political conditions in violent places to share risks in a way that is more difficult 
to stop efforts to promote change.154  Specifically, networks accomplish the following: 1) 
bring together functionally diverse actors, 2) bring awareness of problems to state leaders 
in hopes of changing conditions, 3) facilitate efforts and build norms of social and 
political behavior, and 4) allow groups with diverse viewpoints to work together in 
achieving common objectives.155  After preliminarily understanding social networks and 
how they operate, the next paragraph illustrates network theory within Brazilian favelas 
and provides more context. 
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The character of the drug problem in Brazil may be exacerbated by prevailing 
socioeconomic conditions, namely the disparity between favelas and more developed 
parts of Brazil.156  These conditions create an environment emphasizing the primacy of 
resource allocation and control; the typical favela resident does not have access to many 
goods and services, thus power and legitimacy is bestowed on actors that can provide 
commodities otherwise non-accessible.  For a majority of favela history, the state was 
inadequate in delivering basic services to residents, in the wake, DTOs introduced 
themselves as a prominent power.157  In this context, Brazilian DTOs focus on forging 
relationships with important actors for access to goods and services.  By the violent 
nature of their existence, DTOs impose their will on actors and control the commodity of 
access.  What we witness is the convergence of a network system.  These networks are 
predicated on expectations and exchanges among traffickers, favela residents, politicians, 
and other organizations.  Desmond Arias takes network theory to another level and goes 
beyond clientelistic158 or neo-clientelistic159 observations to illustrate a two-tiered 
clientelism.  This two-tiered clientelism refers to how politicians distribute favors to 
traffickers, and how traffickers then redistribute those favors to favela residents.  Within 
this system, “traffickers are free to negotiate patronage with a number of politicians but 
in which ordinary favela residents obtain political patronage through a single trafficker 
who dominates the favela they live in partially through force.”160  Specifically, network 
operations in Brazil’s favelas can be further codified, the following paragraph breaks this 
down further. 
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This network system is characterized via five factors.  First, the traffickers are a 
constant presence providing goods and services while politicians only appear around 
election periods.  Second, civic leaders mediate contacts between residents, politicians 
and criminals.  Third, traffickers have more personal relations with residents than do 
politicians. Fourth, traffickers and residency association allies control access and resource 
allocation.  Finally, traffickers provide an independent and personal assistance to favela 
residents that are differentiated from what politicians provide.161  Across Arias’ 
literature, we find examples of intricate deals among AMs, traffickers and politicians.  
While names, dates, and locations vary, the interactions portrayed usually involved 
brokered interactions between traffickers and politicians through civic leaders.  In 
exchange for favelas services, such as remodeling a building and kickers, such as money 
or cell phones, politicians were given access and advertisement to favela residents.  In 
many cases, the AMs or go-betweens were given a percentage and allowed to continue in 
their job capacity as civic leaders.  Traffickers received patronage from residents because 
they were perceived as providing the goods and services in question.   In many cases, the 
vote was delivered to the politician in question.162  This section illustrated how networks 
in Brazil’s favelas sustain clientelistic practices among traffickers, residents, residency 
associations, and politicians.  These networks are essential in providing institutional 
sustainability for drug trafficking organizations in Brazilian favelas.     
So, what emerges as similarities and differences in what sustains DTOs in the 
case studies?  First and foremost, DTOs in Colombia and Brazil operate in very divergent 
circumstances.  Brazil’s political landscape does not consist of the myriad of actors 
involved in the drug trade in comparison to Colombia.  Therefore, the Brazilian 
government has not needed to differentiate between actors in its own counter-drug effort.  
The Brazilian focus retains a counter-drug perspective as opposed to a counter-
insurgency perspective that may abate or confuse state efforts (as the case for Colombia).  
Informal DTO networks are able to flourish in Brazil’s favelas because they operate 
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without significant state attention.  Unlike Colombia, where informal armed actors 
threaten state sovereignty through large-scale conflict, DTOs in Brazil do not garner the 
same type of counter-insurgency attention.  Rather, DTOs focus on internal dynamics to 
facilitate the drug trade.  Moreover, because DTOs in Brazil deal with distribution as 
opposed to production and cultivation of illicit drugs, errors in aerial fumigation are 
removed for consideration as a strategic failure.  Enrique Desmond Arias in Drug and 
Democracy in Rio de Janeiro (2006) attributes overarching differences in illegal 
networks as the “structural contours of criminal opportunities presented in an area.”163  
His assessment aptly applies in explaining the contextual differences between the 
Colombian and Brazilian case studies.  However, despite these important differences, 
there are two important points of convergence when looking at sustainability for DTOs in 
the case studies.   
First, DTOs in both cases have managed to supplant the formal government in 
areas lacking significant state presence.  Second, civilians within the case studies are the 
important median for the proliferation of DTOs.  In the Colombian case study, the 
informal, armed actors of major cartels, decentralized cartels, insurgencies, 
paramilitaries, and successor paramilitary groups have chronologically controlled areas of 
drug producing land.  These groups in turn have controlled the drug trade.  In controlling 
these lands, DTOs in Colombia exercise sovereignty in these lands lacking significant 
state presence.  Brazilian DTOs have not witnessed the chronological succession of land 
control by actors because the drug trade occurs in pre-established favela zones.  
However, there have been issues of zone control as differing factions have vied for 
controlling points of sale in these communities.  Because favelas witness a lack of 
significant state presence, an informal, second-tiered form of governance is practiced 
with DTOs in a prime role.  The convergence of physical control of rural drug producing 
lands in Colombia and zone control in Brazil’s favelas illustrate how DTOs supplant 
formal governance in the areas that lack significant state presence in the case studies.  
This observation illustrates the first similarity in sustainability for the case studies.  
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Besides the physical control of rural, drug producing land in Colombia and control of 
favela zones (and points of drug sales) in Brazil, the phenomenon of informal governance 
in these areas is facilitated by DTO interactions with the civilian base in the case studies. 
In the Colombian case study, the lives of the civilian population were shaped by 
the myriad of political and economic actors in Colombia’s historical and contemporary 
structure.  Vanda Felbab-Brown in Shooting Up (2010) illustrates how various groups in 
the Colombian drug trade garnered political capital.  In the era of prominent cartels, 
DTOs utilized their “role in the illicit economy as a platform for building popular 
support.”164  DTOs accomplished this by bringing in much needed capital to poorer 
sectors, reducing unemployment, and investing in social projects and social services.  
Once insurgency groups, such as the FARC, embraced the drug economy, these groups 
garnered political capital among the civilian base by dispensing justice, forming and 
regulating laws, as well as providing protection.  Subsequent paramilitary groups and 
successor paramilitary groups have employed the same practices to garner support, albeit 
with limited success due to concurrent brutality experienced by the civilian base.  
Moreover, paramilitaries have expanded their political influence through intimidation and 
bribery.  At the local and national levels, there is concern over how much paramilitaries 
have infiltrated politics.  Chapter III highlighted how DTOs in Brazil utilize two-tiered 
clientelism to provide goods and services to favela residents.  Moreover, informal 
networks in Brazil’s favelas incorporate mediators (residency associations) to broker 
relationships between the DTOs, people living in the favelas, and politicians.  These 
observations illustrate another important facet of sustainability that was highlighted in the 
case studies.  Interactions between the DTOs and the civilian population has both actively 
undermined the state while serving to strengthen the DTOs’ position in the social 
structure through their use and accumulation of political capital and economic resources 
they have gained over time.      
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis looked at three facets in understanding drug trafficking organizations 
in Colombia and Brazil, these facets included: 1) the emergence of DTOs, 2) how these 
DTOs meet the criteria for being informal institutions, and, 3) what sustains these 
organizations.  Chapters II and III illustrated the emergence of DTOs in their respective 
case studies, while also highlighting important similarities and differences.  Summarily 
put, drug trafficking in both cases emerged from similar geographical shifts within the 
drug trade.  Geographic factors and political factors contributed to the structuring of the 
drug trade with uniqueness to the specific case studies.  Drug trafficking prominently 
emerged in Colombia in the 1970s with a focus on controlling land for illicit crop 
cultivation, production, trafficking and distribution.  Drug trafficking emerged in Brazil 
in the 1980s and focused on controlling illicit points of sale within favela zones.  In this 
respect, the Brazilian case study is much more insular and internally focused.  DTOs in 
both case studies emerged from pre-existing conditions, actors, and characteristics 
congruent with criminal enterprise.  However, political conditions in Colombia created 
actors unique to the Colombian case.  In this respect, understanding the proliferation of 
drug trafficking and associated organizations requires: 1) recognizing how the myriad of 
actors have contributed to drug dynamics, and, 2) how political conditions and policy 
have shaped drug dynamics within the country.  Conditions within Brazil are also 
complex; the proliferation of DTOs within the auspices of favela “brown zones” is 
facilitated by complex relationships and dynamics within these areas. 
This thesis also established DTOs in Colombia and Brazil as informal institutions.  
Holistically and summarily, there was little differentiation between DTOs when looking 
at the characteristics of structural composition, stability, behavioral control, and social 
cohesion.  Similarities can be attributed to the shared nature of criminal enterprise.  From 
this perspective, these institutions (DTOs) aim to survive and remain viable in the drug 
trade despite counter-drug approaches.  Therefore, actors within these institutions (DTOs) 
are shaped by similar motivations and constraints, and thus display similar institutional 
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characteristics.  However, when looking at the informal institutionalization of DTOs in 
the respective case studies, context provides differentiation.   
Differences in structural composition, stability, behavioral control, and social 
cohesion emerge when looking at specific contexts.  DTOs in Colombia are a structural 
feature of society and are stable institutions, much like in Brazil.  However, the 
Colombian landscape incorporates different actors; furthermore, stability takes into 
account the changing dynamic of the drug trade as the myriad of actors exercised 
differing amounts of control and primacy depending on political circumstances.  
Behavioral control and social cohesion also manifest uniquely in the case studies.  DTOs 
in both case studies utilize behavioral control and display social cohesion.  Behavioral 
control is premised on placing implied rules, expectations, and norms on members while 
accountability is mostly enforced through violence.  Social cohesion is observed similarly 
because DTOs in both cases comprise of people with roughly the same socioeconomic 
profile.  However, differences can be garnered when taking into account specific contexts 
within the Colombian and Brazilian drug trade.  Finally, the third facet analyzed 
comprised of sustainability applied to DTOs in the case studies.  In Colombia, 
sustainability is attributed to competitive adaptation and strategic failures in U.S. and 
Colombian policies.  In Brazil, sustainability is attributed to informal networks.  
Differences and similarities were highlighted earlier in this chapter.  The thesis concedes 
that these sustainability factors are not mutually exclusive.  Much deeper analysis may 
undoubtedly uncover DTOs in Colombia utilizing informal networks and DTOs in Brazil 
utilizing competitive adaptation.  Moreover, Brazilian counter-drug policy may indeed 
have its own strategic shortfalls.  However, the essential take-away is what sustains these 
DTOs in their respective contexts.  Subsequent paragraphs address how the proliferation 
of DTOs can be mitigated in the case studies of Colombia and Brazil.     
The drug trade in Colombia has historically centered on the control of drug 
producing land.  However, as Chapter IV highlighted, U.S.–Colombian policy has 
focused on specific actors and supply eradication approaches, these strategies have 
amounted to strategic failures.  The underlying issue is to systematically and holistically 
control drug-producing land.  Moreover, control of this land must be garnered with 
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legitimacy by the state.  In this regard, three key issues need to be addressed if Colombia 
is to move forward from attacking insurgency to getting back to countering its drug 
problem.  First and foremost, true demobilization and repatriation of armed actors is 
required to remove violence as a tool for controlling land.  Concurrent with this first 
point, the Colombian military needs continuous professionalization and education to 
avoid the current paramilitary phenomenon.   
Second, supply-side eradication (aerial fumigation) needs to be revamped.  By 
providing viable alternatives and assistance to farmers that grow illicit crops, the 
phenomenon of the balloon effect can be mitigated while gaining the support and trust of 
the civilian population.  Assistance should be comprehensive in nature and incorporate 
developmental aspects of rural land.  Vanda Felbab-Brown, in testimony before the U.S. 
House of Representatives (Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee) on April 14, 2010 stated: 
Effective rural development does require not only proper sequencing with 
eradication and security, but also a well-funded, long-lasting, and 
comprehensive approach that does not center merely on searching for the 
replacement crop. Alternative developments need to address all the 
structural drivers of why communities participate in illegal economies— 
such as access to markets and their development, deficiencies in 
infrastructure and irrigation systems, access to microcredit, and the 
establishment of value-added chains.165 
Third, in the backdrop of these approaches, political and social institutions must 
be strengthened for any gains to be substantiated over time.  The amount of money and 
hardware dedicated toward military and supply-side solutions siphons off important 
resources for longer-term solutions.  The convergence of these factors may not curtail 
global demand for drugs, but will significantly improve conditions in Colombia.  If gains 
in these areas are realized, then the government of Colombia will subsequently control 
drug-producing land.  The control of such land has been the focal point for the  
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proliferation of drug trafficking and associated organizations, both historically and in 
contemporary studies.  The next paragraph addresses how the proliferation of DTOs can 
be mitigated in Brazil. 
Brazil’s drug trafficking problem can be attributed to numerous converging 
factors.  The prevailing conditions of socioeconomic inequality and lack of state capacity 
within the favelas are structural parameters to understanding Brazil’s drug problem as a 
whole.  These problems are challenging and require comprehensive approaches with 
broadened state resources.  First and foremost, Brazil is a large consumer market for 
illicit drugs.  While traditional supply side approaches fail to rid Latin America of drugs, 
demand side education and rehabilitation programs should be utilized in Brazilian 
favelas.166  Second, breaking the cycle of poverty, inequality, and recruitment into DTOs 
is a question of long-term investment in human capital (meaning investing in education 
and health).  Bolsa Familia in Brazil is a program that “provides cash subsidies for the 
poor in return for a combination of regular school attendance by their children and use of 
preventive medical care.  Evidence shows that these programs are instrumental in 
reducing poverty and increasing primary and secondary school attendance, at least in the 
short term.”167  Lastly, if we assume networks to be the sustaining factor of drug 
trafficking organizations then there might be viable comprehensive approaches to 
mitigate DTO influence within these networks.  “Competing networks may be introduced 
that bring residents, civic leaders, and state actors together to collectively resolve drug 
trafficking and local violence.”168  The exact dynamics of competing networks should be 
further researched and important questions should be asked.  What are the critical 
junctures to introduce new networks, and how can competing networks avoid the violent 
and insular characteristics of entrenched DTOs within Brazilian favelas?  
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